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ABSTRACT
This Article debunks the idea that a federal statute’s novelty is an
indication that the statute violates constitutional principles of
federalism or the separation of powers. In the last six years, every
Justice on the Supreme Court has signed onto the idea that legislative
novelty signals that a statute is unconstitutional. Many courts of appeals
have also latched onto antinovelty rhetoric, two doing so in the course
of finding federal statutes unconstitutional. The Supreme Court’s
rhetoric about legislative novelty originated as an observation: the
Court described a statute as novel when distinguishing that statute from
other, constitutionally permissible ones. Since then, the Court has
weaponized its rhetoric about legislative novelty such that a federal
statute’s novelty is now a “telling indication” that the statute is
unconstitutional.
This Article urges the Court to abandon this rhetoric. The idea that
legislative novelty is a sign that a statute is unconstitutional primarily
rests on the mistaken Madisonian premise that Congress reliably
exercises the full scope of its constitutional powers and that prior
Congresses’ failure to enact a statute shows that prior Congresses
assumed that the statute was unconstitutional. But there are myriad
reasons why Congress does not enact statutes: enacting federal laws is
difficult—in part because of constitutional requirements—and
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Congress legislates in response to existing conditions, which change
over time. There are also many reasons why Congress may not
innovate and why Congress may not have enacted every
constitutionally permissible means of regulation. This Article suggests
that there may be a more limited role for legislative novelty to play in
areas of underenforced constitutional norms where courts have
struggled to articulate workable doctrinal rules. Even then, a statute’s
novelty should carry little weight in any determination about the
statute’s constitutionality. Finally, this Article reflects on whether
rejecting the Court’s rhetoric about legislative novelty necessarily calls
into question the idea that a history of similar congressional statutes is
evidence that a statute is constitutional.
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[S]ometimes “the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional
problem is the lack of historical precedent” for Congress’s action.
—Chief Justice John Roberts1
[A] doubtful question [regarding] the respective powers of those who
are equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted if not
put to rest by the practice of the government. An exposition of the
constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts ought not to be
lightly disregarded.
—Chief Justice John Marshall2

INTRODUCTION
Change undergirds many difficult questions in constitutional law.
One persistent question is how the Constitution may change—through
the formal amendment process, through social movements, or through
judicial decisions.3 Another is whether, and when, changed
circumstances should alter how the Constitution is interpreted.4
1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (quoting Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)).
2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
3. See generally Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011 (2012)
(book review) (describing popular and social movements that precipitate constitutional change);
Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002) (same); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) (describing sources of change other than
constitutional amendments).
4. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (posing the question of when a changing “understanding of the facts” merits

LITMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1410

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/11/2017 9:03 AM

[Vol. 66:1407

Still another question has begun to emerge recently—whether
legislative change, meaning a federal statute’s novelty, speaks to
whether that statute is constitutional. Three decades ago, the Supreme
Court began to suggest that a federal statute’s novelty could be
evidence that the statute exceeded the scope of Congress’s delegated
powers or violated the Tenth Amendment. When the Court in New
York v. United States5 held that Congress could not require state
legislatures to enact federal directives, it observed that the challenged
federal statute was different from other statutes: “The . . . [challenged]
provision appears to be unique. No other federal statute has been cited
which offers a state government no option other than that of
implementing legislation enacted by Congress.”6 Five years later,
Printz v. United States7 turned New York’s observation into an
affirmative reason for why a federal statute purporting to require state
executives to enforce federal law was unconstitutional.8 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia maintained that if “earlier Congresses avoided
use of this highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe
that the power was thought not to exist.”9
Since Printz, the Court has, on several occasions, trotted out the
idea that legislative novelty signals that a statute is unconstitutional in
cases regarding federalism and separation of powers.10 For example,
when the Court held in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board11 that the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) removal structure violated the
separation of powers, it maintained that “the most telling indication of
the severe constitutional problem with the PCAOB is the lack of
historical precedent for this entity.”12 And all of the opinions that
concluded that the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) minimum-coverage
requirement exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce reasoned that the minimum-coverage requirement’s novelty
constitutional change); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 5 (2010) (arguing that
the Constitution’s meaning must change as time passes).
5. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
6. Id. at 177.
7. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
8. Id. at 935.
9. Id. at 905.
10. Two years after Printz, Alden v. Maine relied on the same principle, without qualifying
that the federal power must be highly attractive. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999).
11. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 505.
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was a strong indication that it was unconstitutional—what this Article
calls antinovelty rhetoric.13
The Court’s rhetoric about legislative novelty is related to a more
familiar issue in constitutional law: how congressional practice factors
into constitutional interpretation and, specifically, whether a statute is
more likely to be constitutional because it is part of a longstanding
history of similar congressional enactments. This idea is sometimes
associated with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland.14
Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison have since
examined “the proper role of historical practice in” questions about
“the distribution of authority between Congress and the executive
branch.”15 Like Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch, Bradley and
Morrison also addressed when a pattern of one branch’s acts can
establish that branch’s legal authority.16
Bradley and Morrison, as well as Chief Justice Marshall, were
concerned with the inverse of the idea that legislative novelty signals
that a statute is unconstitutional—when the existence of similar
congressional statutes or executive actions suggests that there is
constitutional authority to enact a certain statute or take an executive
action.17 They did not address when congressional inaction may
support the claim that Congress lacks constitutional authority.18
The use of antinovelty rhetoric is now commonly employed by the
federal courts. Every Justice on the Supreme Court has joined an

13. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012); id. at 2649 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., dissenting).
14. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); see, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (1998) (linking
McCulloch with the idea “that the Constitution allows the living legislature to govern”); Barry
Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 n.25 (1998)
(same).
15. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 HARV. L. REV. 412, 413 (2012); see also id. at 416 (“[O]ur consideration of the role of
historical practice is limited to the constitutional separation of powers, and in particular to issues
of executive and legislative power.”).
16. Id. at 432.
17. Bradley and Morrison explained the relevant principle as follows: a longstanding pattern
of one branch’s actions justifies that branch’s legal authority when “the other branch can be
deemed to have ‘acquiesced’ in the practice over time.” Id.
18. Some of the reasons Bradley and Morrison give for why “it is precarious to infer
congressional acquiescence” from “the absence of legislation prohibiting the executive action in
question,” id. at 448, also speak to whether congressional silence or inaction may signify a
constitutional infirmity, see id. at 440–43. For a similar discussion, see infra Part II.A.
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opinion promoting the idea that legislative novelty is evidence of a
constitutional defect, and this rhetoric has appeared in at least one
majority opinion in each of the last six terms.19 In that same time,
several panels of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,20 as
well as panels on the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth21 and Sixth
Circuits,22 have also relied on the idea that a statute’s novelty is
evidence that the statute is unconstitutional, two doing so in the course
of holding a federal statute unconstitutional.
Still, there is a fair amount of uncertainty about how significant
legislative novelty is to a court’s ultimate conclusion that a statute is
unconstitutional. Accordingly, now is the time to critically assess and
debunk the idea that legislative novelty is a sign that a statute violates
constitutional principles of federalism or the separation of powers. This
Article has three aims.23 First, it traces the evolution of the idea that
legislative novelty is evidence of a constitutional infirmity, defines its
contours, and spells out its justifications. Second, it critically assesses
the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric. This Article maintains that legislative
novelty is not evidence and should not be used as evidence that a
statute is unconstitutional on federalism or separation-of-powers
grounds. In those contexts, novelty should only be used to assure a
judge that a ruling invalidating a federal statute (for reasons unrelated
to the statute’s novelty) will not have disastrous practical
consequences. Third, it compares the rhetoric about legislative novelty
with the inverse idea that a longstanding pattern of congressional
statutes is evidence of those statutes’ constitutionality. This Article
does not reach a conclusion on whether that inverse principle is

19. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12; cf. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart,
563 U.S. 247, 260 (2011) (“Novelty, however, is often the consequence of past constitutional
doubts . . . .”).
20. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2013); SevenSky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 221–
22 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Tatel, J., concurring); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
21. United States v. Kebodeaux, 687 F.3d 232, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2012).
22. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 556, 559 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012).
23. Neal Katyal and Thomas Schmidt maintain that NFIB “yielded an important
constitutional innovation,” which they call the “antinovelty doctrine: a law without historical
precedent is constitutionally suspect.” Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active
Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2139 (2015).
But Katyal and Schmidt foreswear any kind of critical examination or assessment of the
antinovelty doctrine, explaining that their “purpose is not to debunk the antinovelty doctrine on
the merits.” Id. at 2149.
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justified. But it shows that the reasons for rejecting the Court’s
antinovelty rhetoric do not require the inverse principle to be rejected,
and there may be independently sufficient justifications for the inverse
principle.
Before proceeding further, one caveat is in order: this Article’s
accounting of antinovelty rhetoric is limited to issues of constitutional
federalism and the separation of powers, not individual rights.
Antinovelty rhetoric has been invoked, albeit in a different form, in
two cases concerning individual rights, Romer v. Evans24 and United
States v. Windsor.25 Romer held unconstitutional a Colorado state
amendment that repealed municipal legislation—and barred future
municipal legislation—that extended nondiscrimination protections to
persons based on their sexual orientation.26 Romer maintained that the
amendment was “exceptional”27 and “unprecedented in our
jurisprudence.”28 Romer then reasoned that “[t]he absence of
precedent . . . is itself instructive” because “[d]iscriminations of an
unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to
determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision”
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.29 Windsor subsequently
quoted this language when it held the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) unconstitutional.30
There are, however, several differences between controversies
regarding individual rights and controversies regarding constitutional
structure that may be relevant to whether the Court’s antinovelty
rhetoric is justified in the two contexts. First, part of this Article’s
critique of antinovelty rhetoric in cases regarding constitutional
structure depends on how Congress functions, which has less
significance in cases involving individual rights because individualrights cases concern not only Congress, but also state and local
governments. When a court invokes antinovelty rhetoric in cases

24. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
25. Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
26. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36.
27. Id. at 632.
28. Id. at 633.
29. Id. (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928)). The
Court in Romer then declared, “It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this
sort.” Id.
30. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. For a countering view that DOMA’s regulation of marriage
is not novel, see Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1721 (1991).
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involving federalism or the separation of powers, it will only search for
similar congressional statutes. State statutes are not relevant because
states are not subject to the constitutional federalism and separationof-powers limitations that apply to Congress. But the Bill of Rights and
other individual-rights amendments are largely incorporated against
the states. Therefore, when a court asks whether there are similar
statutes—or a lack thereof—in cases involving individual rights, the
court may survey statutes enacted by state governments and their
instrumentalities. Because state and local legislatures are not subject
to the same restrictions as Congress, several of the critiques of
antinovelty rhetoric may not apply with as much force in cases
involving individual rights. Second, there are potentially different
justifications for antinovelty rhetoric in cases of individual rights, such
as the potential for oppression of disfavored minorities,31 and these
other justifications require separate treatment. Third, the relevant
constitutional text and structure—which this Article uses to critique
antinovelty rhetoric—treat constitutional federalism and the
separation of powers differently than individual rights. Finally, in both
doctrine and scholarship, practice-based arguments are treated
differently in cases of individual rights versus cases of constitutional
structure. Chief Justice Marshall, for example, cabined his statement in
McCulloch to apply only where “the great principles of liberty are not
concerned,”32 and Bradley and Morrison similarly walled off
“individual rights controversies” from their analysis.33 These
differences between the two kinds of cases “are sufficient . . . to focus
exclusively” on one set of them—those involving questions of
constitutional structure.34
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I identifies the Court’s
increasing reliance on antinovelty rhetoric. Part II then examines the
primary justification for the idea that legislative novelty is evidence of
a constitutional defect, which turns on the mistaken assumption that
Congress reliably exercises the full scope of its powers. Part III

31. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 416 (contending that federalism and
separation-of-powers challenges “do[] not typically raise concerns about the oppression of
minorities or other disadvantaged groups” that arise “in some individual rights areas”).
32. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). Romer—and also Windsor—
similarly defined the relevant principle as applicable to “[d]iscriminations of an unusual
character.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Coleman, 277 U.S. at 37–38); Romer, 517 U.S. at
633 (same).
33. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 416.
34. Id. at 417.
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considers and rejects the idea that Congress’s inaction—through not
enacting statutes—somehow makes a statute unconstitutional and the
claim that legislative novelty should be used as evidence that a statute
is unconstitutional. Part IV concludes that, at most, judges should
consider a statute’s novelty to ensure that invalidating an otherwise
unconstitutional federal statute would not call into question too many
other federal statutes whose invalidation would require a dramatic
restructuring of how government functions day to day.
I. LEGISLATIVE NOVELTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Legislative novelty has factored into several recent controversies
regarding constitutional structure. In the early 1990s, the Supreme
Court observed that a federal statute purporting to require state
legislatures to comply with federal directives was a fundamentally new
form of legislation in the course of holding it unconstitutional. Since
then, the Court has turned its observation about legislative novelty into
a reason why a federal statute may violate constitutional principles of
separation of powers or federalism. Part I.A describes the antinovelty
rhetoric which has been used in several recent controversies. Part I.B
explains the role that antinovelty has played in these rulings.
A. Antinovelty Rhetoric in Constitutional Argument
Several recent Supreme Court decisions have promoted the idea
that legislative novelty is a mark against a law’s constitutionality. The
idea began as something of an observation in New York, which
addressed whether Congress could require state legislatures to regulate
low-level radioactive waste according to federal directives.35 The Court
concluded that Congress did not possess this authority.36 Recognizing
that the Tenth Amendment did not speak to the precise question,37 the
Court explained that “the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that
confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States,”38
and maintained that requiring state legislatures to enact federal
directives is inconsistent with several values that federalism

35. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992). The majority in New York
included Justice O’Connor (the opinion’s author), Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Thomas.
36. Id. at 176–77.
37. Id. at 156–57 (“The Tenth Amendment[’s] . . . limit is not derived from the text of the
Tenth Amendment . . . which . . . is essentially a tautology.”).
38. Id. at 166.
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purportedly serves.39 But New York also noted the apparent novelty of
the take title provision. It surmised that “[t]he take title provision is of
a different character” from other kinds of federal regulations,40 and it
observed that the “provision appears to be unique. No other federal
statute has been cited which offers a state government no option other
than that of implementing legislation enacted by Congress.”41
Five years later, in Printz v. United States, the Court held that
Congress could not require state law enforcement officers to enforce
federal law.42 Although New York had closed with an observation
about the challenged statute’s novelty, the Court in Printz explicitly
framed its analysis around the idea that legislative novelty signifies a
constitutional infirmity. Again conceding that “no constitutional text
sp[oke] to this precise question,”43 Justice Scalia framed the issue this
way:
The Government contends . . . that “the earliest Congresses enacted
statutes that required the participation of state officials in
the implementation of federal laws.” . . . [E]arly congressional
enactments “provid[e] contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the
Constitution’s meaning.” Indeed, such “contemporaneous legislative
exposition of the Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of
years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions.” Conversely if,
as petitioners contend, earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly
attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was
thought not to exist.44

39. Id. at 168–69.
40. Id. at 174–75.
41. Id. at 177. Similar to New York, the Court in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. also observed
that a statute was novel in the course of finding that statute unconstitutional. Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230 (1995). The Plaut Court also suggested the statute’s novelty was
relevant to the constitutional analysis, but in less forceful terms than Printz and other cases later
adopted: “Apart from the statute we review today, we know of no instance in which Congress has
attempted to set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation. That
prolonged reticence would be amazing if such interference were not understood to be
constitutionally proscribed.” Id.
42. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). The majority in Printz included Justice
Scalia (the opinion’s author), Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and
Justice Thomas.
43. Id. at 905.
44. Id. (second alteration in original) (third omission in original) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted) (first quoting Brief for the United States at 28, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503), 1996 WL 595005, at *28; then quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 748 U.S.
714, 723–24 (1986); and then quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926)). This
statement is also technically the inverse of the preceding one.
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Moreover, after noting that early statutes imposed federal duties
on state courts or state judges, but not state executives,45 the Court
explained: “[T]he numerousness of these statutes, contrasted with the
utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States’ executive
(notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress),
suggests an assumed absence of such power.”46 Based on the “absence
of executive-commandeering statutes in the early Congresses” as well
as the “absence of them in our later history as well, at least until very
recent years,”47 the Court surmised, “The constitutional practice we
have examined above tends to negate the existence of the
congressional power asserted here.”48
Shortly after Printz, the Court relied on legislative novelty in
Alden v. Maine49 to justify the rule that Article I does not provide
Congress with the power to subject unconsenting states to suits for
damages in state court.50 Examining “early congressional practice,”51 it
concluded that it had “discovered no instance in which [early
Congresses] purported to authorize suits against nonconsenting States
in” state court.52 Quoting Printz,53 the Court then surmised that “early
Congresses did not believe they had the power to authorize private
suits against the States in their own courts.”54
New York, Alden, and Printz each contained antinovelty rhetoric
that was used to identify federalism-based constraints about how
Congress may regulate the states when Congress regulates in spheres
that concededly fall within its Article I powers. The Court has
subsequently invoked similar antinovelty rhetoric in cases that identify
separation-of-powers constraints on how Congress may structure
45. Id. at 907. The Printz Court said that a late nineteenth-century statute did not state a
command and that a draft statute was not coercive. Id. at 916–17. It offered some reasons for
distinguishing between state judicial and executive officers. See id. at 907 (relying on the
Supremacy Clause, Congress’s ability to not create federal courts, and the tradition of courts
applying foreign law). For a critique of the Court’s reasoning, see Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 213–14.
46. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907–08.
47. Id. at 916.
48. Id. at 918.
49. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). The majority in Alden was the same majority as in
Printz. Justice Kennedy, rather than Justice Scalia, wrote that opinion.
50. Id. at 745.
51. Id. at 743.
52. Id.; see also id. at 744 (“[S]tatutes purporting to authorize private suits against
nonconsenting States in state courts . . . are all but absent from our historical experience.”).
53. Id. at 744.
54. Id.
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federal agencies. For example, Free Enterprise Fund examined the
constitutionality of the PCAOB, which, by statute, consisted of five
members removable only for cause by the SEC.55 Additionally, the
SEC consisted of members who were removable only for cause by the
President. The Court concluded that the PCAOB’s double layer of forcause removal protection violated “the Constitution’s separation of
powers,”56 which requires the President to have some control over
officers executing federal law.57 “Perhaps the most telling indication of
the severe constitutional problem with the PCAOB,” the Court
maintained, “is the lack of historical precedent for this entity.”58 The
Court then stressed the PCAOB’s novelty throughout its analysis.59
Two years later, the Court invoked Free Enterprise Fund’s
antinovelty rhetoric in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius (NFIB),60 the case in which five Justices stated that Congress
lacked authority under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause to require individuals to purchase health insurance.61
The Chief Justice’s opinion, which stated that the minimum-coverage
requirement exceeded Congress’s powers, began with the observation
that “Congress ha[d] never attempted to rely on [its] power[s] to
compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted
product.”62 The opinion quoted Free Enterprise Fund’s antinovelty
rhetoric,63 but it also framed antinovelty rhetoric in slightly softer
terms, suggesting that “[a]t the very least, we should ‘pause to consider
the implications of the Government’s arguments’ when confronted
with such new conceptions of federal power.’”64 The joint dissent—
55. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484, 486–87 (2010).
The Free Enterprise Fund majority included Chief Justice Roberts (the opinion’s author), Justice
Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito.
56. Id. at 492.
57. Id. at 492, 497–98.
58. Id. at 506. Free Enterprise Fund’s forceful account of antinovelty rhetoric directly quotes
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent to the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
59. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 514 (calling the double layer of protection a “new type
of restriction”); id. at 496 (calling it a “novel structure”); id. at 505 (calling it “highly unusual”);
id. at 505 (noting that “[t]he parties [had] identified only a handful of isolated positions” that
might be similar).
60. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
61. Id. at 2591.
62. Id. at 2586.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)).
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authored by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—agreed with
the conclusion that the minimum-coverage requirement exceeded the
scope of Congress’s powers.65 It similarly emphasized the minimumcoverage requirement’s novelty,66 and at oral argument, Justice
Kennedy explained the implications of the minimum-coverage
requirement’s novelty: “Assume for the moment that this is
unprecedented . . . . If that is so, do you not have a heavy burden of
justification?”67
The Court has also relied on a statute’s apparent novelty to find
that it unconstitutionally infringed on the President’s power to
recognize foreign states. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry,68 while discussing the
pertinent history, the Court observed, “‘[T]he most striking thing’
about the history of recognition ‘is what is absent from it: a situation
like this one,’ where Congress has enacted a statute contrary to the
President’s formal and considered statement concerning
recognition.”69 Based in part on the lack of analogous congressional
statutes, Zivotofsky inferred that Congress did not have the power to
recognize foreign states and held that the statute was unconstitutional.
Some antinovelty rhetoric has also appeared in cases that address
the scope of executive power under Article II, independent of
Congress enacting legislation that infringes on the President’s powers.
Although these cases are related to Zivotofsky, they differ for purposes
of this Article’s argument because they do not involve the
constitutionality of a federal statute.70 For example, the Court relied on

65. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2647, 2649 (describing the minimum-coverage requirement as “unprecedented”
and explaining that “the relevant history is . . . that [Congress] has never before used the
Commerce Clause to compel entry into commerce”).
67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2011/11-398-Tuesday.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW6U-J5E6].
68. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). The statute directed the U.S. Department of
State to identify “Israel” as an applicant’s birthplace on her passport when the applicant was born
in Jerusalem and requested such identification. See id. at 2082. The Zivotofsky majority included
Justice Kennedy (the opinion’s author), Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and
Justice Kagan.
69. Id. at 2091 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(Tatel, J., concurring)). The Zivotofsky Court’s invocation of antinovelty rhetoric was borrowed
from Judge Tatel’s concurrence to the opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
70. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (finding that a presidential
memorandum had no legal effect on states in part because it “is not supported by a ‘particularly
longstanding practice’ of congressional acquiescence, but rather is what the United States itself
has described as ‘unprecedented action’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
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executive novelty in NLRB v. Noel Canning71 when deciding that the
President’s actions went beyond his “Power to fill up all Vacancies that
may happen during the Recess of the Senate.”72
The Court’s skepticism of legislative novelty also appears in cases
that do not explicitly use the same kind of antinovelty rhetoric, as well
as those that ultimately reject a constitutional challenge to a federal
statute. One example of the former is Shelby County v. Holder,73 which
invalidated a part of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).74 The Court
repeatedly emphasized the novelty of the VRA provision it struck
down, describing it as “extraordinary” no less than nine times.75 An
example of a case where the statute’s constitutionality was ultimately
upheld notwithstanding antinovelty rhetoric is Virginia Office for
Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart (VOPA),76 where sovereign
immunity was deemed to pose no bar to federal courts hearing suits for
prospective injunctive relief brought by independent state agencies
vested with federal rights.77 The VOPA Court quoted Free Enterprise
Fund’s language that a “telling indication of [a] severe constitutional
problem . . . is [a] lack of historical precedent”78 and also noted that the
“weightie[st] [constitutional] objection” to the suits was their “relative
novelty.”79
The federal courts of appeals have also latched onto the Court’s
antinovelty rhetoric, including in cases that invalidate federal
statutes.80 The Fifth Circuit relied on legislative novelty when it held en

Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003); then quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
at 29–30, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566))).
71. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2566–67.
73. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
74. Id. at 2631. For more information on the VRA and the Court’s decision, see infra notes
159–63, 405–06.
75. Id. at 2618.
76. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247 (2011).
77. Id. at 260–61.
78. Id. at 270 (first alteration in original) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)).
79. Id. at 260; see also id. (explaining that “[l]ack of historical precedent can indicate a
constitutional infirmity” and that “[n]ovelty . . . is often the consequence of past constitutional
doubts”).
80. Other cases address antinovelty rhetoric but uphold the federal statute. See, e.g., Thomas
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 556, 559 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring)
(explaining that “[l]egislative novelty typically is not a constitutional virtue” and that this fact
“dignifie[d] the plaintiffs’ argument”); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The
novelty . . . is not irrelevant. The Supreme Court occasionally has treated a particular legislative
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banc that a provision of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.81
(The Supreme Court later reversed that decision in United States v.
Kebodeaux,82 without saying anything about the statute’s novelty.83)
The Fifth Circuit framed its analysis by saying that Printz had indicated
that “a longstanding history of related federal action . . . expands the
deference afforded to a statute. Conversely, the absence of an
historical analog reduces that deference.”84 The D.C. Circuit also relied
on the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric in finding a provision of the
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008
unconstitutional.85 The court maintained that “novelty . . . signal[s]
unconstitutionality”86 and that the lack of an “antecedent” is a “reason
to suspect” that a law is unconstitutional.87 (The Supreme Court
vacated this decision on other grounds.88) Finally, and most recently,
the D.C. Circuit relied on the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric when
holding a statutory provision establishing the structure of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to be
unconstitutional.89 The opinion is littered with references to the
statute’s purported novelty and how the statute’s novelty mattered to
the court’s analysis and conclusion.90

device’s lack of historical pedigree as evidence that the device may exceed Congress’s
constitutional bounds.”).
81. United States v. Kebodeaux, 687 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’d, United
States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013).
82. United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013).
83. See id. at 2501.
84. Kebodeaux, 687 F.3d at 237–38.
85. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated,
U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).
86. Id. at 673.
87. Id.
88. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1228 (2015).
89. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 21–22 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). Indeed, the President
may have more power over agencies headed by a single person, rather than a multimember
commission. A President would only have to convince, fire, or replace one person in the former
case, but he would have to convince, fire, or replace several people in the latter.
90. See, e.g., id. at 6 (“[N]o independent agency exercising substantial executive authority
has ever been headed by a single person. Until now.”); id. at 8 (describing this structure as a “gross
departure” and “never before” used); id. at 21 (noting that the CFPB is “exceptional” and
“unprecedented”).
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B. What Is Antinovelty Rhetoric?
Reliance on legislative novelty is not a consistent theme in judicial
decisions—far from it.91 The Supreme Court has upheld statutes that
are novel without so much as mentioning the statutes’ novelty.92 And it
has included antinovelty rhetoric in decisions upholding statutes
without any explanation for why the statute’s novelty did not make the
statute unconstitutional.93 Part I.A shows only that antinovelty rhetoric
exists and that it has been invoked repeatedly in recent times. This Part
tries to parse what exactly antinovelty rhetoric is by posing two
questions. First, when do courts invoke antinovelty rhetoric? Second,
what is the effect of the antinovelty rhetoric? Does it help resolve the
cases in which it is invoked? Does it further other projects in
constitutional law? Does it shape the outcomes in future cases?
It is difficult to say when exactly legislative novelty affects the
resolution of a question concerning principles of federalism or
separation of powers, or even when the Court will employ antinovelty
rhetoric. Legislative novelty might matter in a case if the Court adopts
antinovelty rhetoric and determines that a federal statute is
unconstitutional. These cases have often divided along ideological
lines, at least in recent times (meaning that Justice Kennedy is in the
majority with either the four more liberal Justices or the four more
conservative Justices).94 They have also tended to be higher-profile

91. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (“Our constitutional principles
of separated powers are not violated, however, by mere anomaly or innovation.”).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2501 (2013) (reversing the Fifth
Circuit’s holding that a provision of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act exceeded
Congress’s power without noting the statute’s novelty). The Chief Justice invoked the antinovelty
principle in his dissent in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, which Justice Sotomayor also joined. Bank
Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The dissent
maintained:
There has never been anything like § 8772 before. Neither the majority nor respondents
have identified another statute that changed the law for a pending case in an outcomedeterminative way and explicitly limited its effect to particular judicial proceedings.
That fact alone is “[p]erhaps the most telling indication of the severe constitutional
problem” with the law.
Id. at 1333 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505
(2010)).
93. In VOPA, for example, the Court explained that “the apparently novelty” of the suit did
“not at all suggest its unconstitutionality” as opposed to the fact that the “conditions” for such a
suit “rarely coincide.” Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 260–61 (2011).
94. That describes NFIB, Free Enterprise Fund, and Zivotofsky, which were decided when
Justice Scalia was still on the Court. Alden, Printz, and New York were similarly divided along
ideological lines, but they were decided when Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist were
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cases—for example, NFIB and Zivotofsky—rather than those where
legislative novelty apparently did not matter—for example, when the
Court invoked antinovelty rhetoric but held that the statute was
constitutional (VOPA) or when the majority did not mention
legislative novelty but the dissenters or the lower court did (Bank
Markazi v. Peterson95 or Kebodeaux). But the cases where legislative
novelty has “mattered” have not necessarily been high-profile cases to
a general public audience (such as New York or Alden), even if they
were significant federalism and separation-of-powers cases to the
community of lawyers who care about such issues.
The Court’s antinovelty rhetoric, moreover, implies that
legislative novelty matters in its analysis.96 But it is unclear whether the
Court uses novelty as a “factor” in its analysis or as an on–off switch
that adjusts whether a statute is presumed constitutional or presumed
unconstitutional. Sometimes legislative novelty appears to be a factor
that is weighed together with other factors, such as the constitutional
text or doctrine: a novelty score factors into the Court’s overall
assessment of whether a law is constitutional or not.97 The Court in
Alden, for example, used an analysis that appeared to be shaped by a
combined assessment of text, structure, nonoriginalist and originalist
history, and precedent. The Court conceded that “the sovereign
immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms
of the Eleventh Amendment,”98 but it maintained that the
“Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative
interpretations by this Court make clear” that states are immune from
suits for damages.99 In other words, Alden suggested that these

on the Court instead of Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts, and when Justice Souter and
Justice Stevens were on the Court instead of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan.
95. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
96. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (“[T]he lack of
historical precedent” is a “telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem.”).
97. Professor Richard Fallon has observed that different forms of argument cannot be
weighed against one another because they are not commensurable. See generally Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1189 (1987) (considering how to weigh structure and doctrine when they point in different
directions). Others have challenged whether “incommensurability” is a true impediment to
reasoned constitutional decisionmaking. See Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional
Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 607–08 (1999).
98. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1998).
99. Id.
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arguments in combination generate a constitutional rule. Zivotofsky is
similar to Alden in this respect.100
But other times—including in these same cases101—legislative
novelty appears to function more like an on–off switch that adjusts
whether a statute is presumed constitutional (if the statute is not novel)
or presumed unconstitutional (if it is). The entire analysis in Printz
about whether federal commandeering of state executive officers was
consistent with federalism was structured under the framework of
antinovelty—if “earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive
power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought
not to exist.”102 The Chief Justice’s opinion in NFIB was similar: the
opinion deployed antinovelty rhetoric before proceeding to refute the
government’s explanations for why the minimum-coverage
requirement was constitutional.103 Professor Neal Katyal and Thomas
Schmidt have argued that “the basic structure of the Chief Justice’s
opinion” in NFIB reveals an especially high level of scrutiny of the
government’s arguments for why the individual mandate was
constitutional.104 The Chief Justice began his analysis by stating the
Government’s theories for why the mandate was constitutional before
refuting them, thus putting the “burden of establishing the
constitutionality of the law” on the Government.105 Therefore, at a
minimum, courts may be relying on antinovelty rhetoric to excuse
themselves from the kind of reasoning or evidence of
unconstitutionality one might expect in cases declaring federal statutes
unconstitutional.
But are courts deploying antinovelty rhetoric in service of a
conclusion that they have already reached? That antinovelty rhetoric
appears in ideologically divided, higher-profile cases arguably suggests
that legislative novelty itself might not factor significantly in the
resolution of cases. Courts may instead deploy antinovelty rhetoric in
100. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015).
101. Alden also contained analysis that suggested novelty was more like an on–off switch. Like
NFIB, Alden appears to have put the burden on the government to demonstrate that a particular
statute was viewed as constitutional at the time the Constitution was ratified. Responding to the
dissent’s argument that nothing in the historical materials addressed the validity of congressional
statutes purporting to subject the states to suits for damages, the Court replied, “The dissent has
provided no persuasive evidence that the founding generation regarded the States sovereign
immunity as defeasible by federal statute.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 733.
102. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
103. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012).
104. Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 23, at 2141.
105. Id.
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service of another project, and there are at least two theories that
antinovelty rhetoric might further—originalism and antiprogressivism.
Although it is difficult to identify one definition of originalism,106
antinovelty may be related to originalism in that both ideas place a
premium on the past, specifically what the Framers thought the
Constitution meant. But the Court’s general antinovelty rhetoric is not
a particularly good indicator of assumptions about the Constitution’s
original meaning.107 Antinovelty rhetoric is also concerned with
congressional practice during a period of time that extends well beyond
the period during which the Constitution was drafted and ratified.
What Congress did several decades after the Constitution was ratified
is relevant to antinovelty rhetoric but less relevant to ascertaining the
Constitution’s original meaning. Additionally, what Congress did by
enacting statutes—that is, governing—may be qualitatively different
than enacting the Constitution—that is, creating the government.
The Court’s antinovelty rhetoric is probably more related to an
agenda of scaling back the federal government’s authority. When the
Court has used antinovelty rhetoric to invalidate a statute, it has
frequently discounted recently enacted statutes as “not relevant,”
instead focusing on whether the statute is similar to statutes enacted in
the early 1800s.108 In addition, the challenge to the ACA’s minimumcoverage requirement in NFIB looked, to some scholars, like a
renewed challenge to the scope of federal legislative power—
specifically, one that sought to roll back the expansion of congressional
power that occurred during the New Deal.109 Other scholars have
observed a similar trend in recent administrative law cases—a
libertarian-infused skepticism of federal administrative regulation that
rejects the twentieth-century expansion of the administrative state.110
106. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional
Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1755 (2015) (describing originalism as
“underdefined”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2012) (“With the possible exception of ‘originalism,’ there
is no word in constitutional law whose meaning means less than ‘activism.’”).
107. See infra Part II.
108. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (“[T]hey are of such recent
vintage that they are no more probative than the statute before us of a constitutional tradition.”).
109. See Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 83–84
(2012) (showing how arguments against the ACA “challenged th[e] basic constitutional
consensus” of the post-New Deal framework).
110. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of
Administrative Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41–42 (“[T]he New Coke is a living-constitutionalist
movement, a product of thoroughly contemporary values and fears—clearly prompted by
continuing rejection, in some quarters, of the New Deal itself.”).
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Here too antinovelty rhetoric is a way to challenge federal regulation
because it raises questions about the proper authority of the
administrative state, which expanded significantly in the 1930s.111 So
antinovelty rhetoric might be a way to retreat from the kind of federal
social and economic regulation that became common after the 1930s
by only sanctioning already-enacted statutes and regulations. One
defender of the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric, Professor Randy Barnett,
has formulated it in these terms.112
Not all of the Justices who have signed opinions with antinovelty
rhetoric have wanted to roll back the expansion of federal power that
occurred during the New Deal or make constitutional interpretation
align more closely with the Constitution’s original meaning.113
Knowing that antinovelty rhetoric might be a means to further those
projects—particularly a challenge to much of federal social and
economic regulation—may and should give them pause.
Ultimately, however, whether one sees antinovelty rhetoric as an
independent principle of constitutional interpretation or as a tool of
another project in constitutional law is less relevant to this Article than
the mere existence of antinovelty rhetoric. The Court’s repeated
invocations of antinovelty rhetoric—coupled with its suggestion that
legislative novelty matters—will continue to generate litigation and
sometimes result in the invalidation of statutes, assuming the rhetoric
is not rejected. A comparison of the briefs in Printz and NFIB is
instructive: only one of the two principal opening briefs in Printz
mentioned the statute’s purported novelty and it did so only once,114
whereas the opening brief for the state respondents in NFIB used the
word “unprecedented” twenty-one times.115 Recently, in PHH Corp. v.

111. See Mariano-Florentio Cuéllar, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1362
(2014) (“[T]he federal bureaucracy had expanded considerably in the 1930s.”).
112. See Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (And Why Did So
Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331, 1347–49 (2013).
113. See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165,
167 & n.8 (2008) (citing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 7–8 (2005)). They may be joining
opinions with the novelty language out of necessity to secure votes, they may not notice it, or they
may not associate antinovelty rhetoric with these larger projects or the other cases in which it has
been invoked.
114. Brief for Petitioner, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (No. 95-1478), 1996 WL
464182 (no mention); Brief for Petitioner at 37, Mack v. United States, No. 95-1603, 1996 WL
470962, at *37 (“Only in 1975 did an arm of the national government assert authority to command
State officials to regulate interstate commerce.”).
115. Brief for Respondents, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 passim
(2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-400) (using the word “unprecedented” throughout).
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,116 the D.C. Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court’s antinovelty rhetoric, while adding its own variations,
to find the statute establishing the structure of the CFPB
unconstitutional.117
II. THE (IN)SIGNIFICANCE OF LEGISLATIVE NOVELTY
Part II analyzes whether legislative novelty should serve as
evidence that a federal statute violates constitutional principles of
federalism or separation of powers. It does so by unpacking and
assessing the primary justification that has been offered for antinovelty
rhetoric, which is that legislative novelty suggests that previous
Congresses assumed similar legislation was unconstitutional.118 Some
more recent cases, such as Free Enterprise Fund, have offered what
may be a slightly different formulation. That formulation is examined
Parts III.C.
The idea that legislative novelty suggests that prior Congresses
believed that similar legislation was unconstitutional is premised on the
notion that if Congress possessed a particular power, it would have
exercised it. The assumption that the legislature exercises the full scope
of its powers is related to a conception of government that James
Madison articulated in Federalist 51. According to Madison, the
officials in each branch of government would aggressively exercise the
full set of constitutional powers they possessed such that each branch
would check the other—“[a]mbition must be made to counteract
ambition.”119 Professor Daryl Levinson has illustrated how this account
of government pervades both theory and doctrine regarding federalism

116. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g
en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
117. Id. at 6–8, 22–23.
118. See Alden v. Maine, 520 U.S. 706, 744 (1999). Some cases avoided identifying who thinks
that a congressional power did not exist by framing the antinovelty principle in the passive voice.
The Court in Printz, for example, said that “if . . . earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly
attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist,” but it
does not identify who thought the power did not exist. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905
(1997) (emphasis added). And Printz and Alden reasoned that “the utter lack of [similar]
statutes . . . ‘suggests an assumed absence of such power.’” Alden, 527 U.S. at 744 (quoting Printz,
521 U.S. at 907–08). Plaut reasoned similarly. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
230 (1995). These cases, however, must be primarily talking about Congress’s beliefs. Alden made
this clear: “It thus appears early Congresses did not believe they had the power to authorize
private suits against the States in their own courts.” Alden, 520 U.S. at 744 (emphasis added).
119. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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and the separation of powers.120 He has also shown how the
assumptions underlying this account of government are seriously
“flawed with respect to . . . Congress.”121
Drawing from Levinson’s and others’ critiques, this Part explains
why legislative novelty will rarely reflect prior Congresses’ assumption
that a statute was unconstitutional. As Part II.A explains, enacting
federal laws is difficult, and the nature of the legislative process
requires Congress to select from among many different priorities and
make compromises. Moreover, as Part II.B explains, congressional
inaction and legislative novelty may arise for other reasons as well.
Judicial decisions may make some legislative choices more attractive
than others, different areas of federal regulation may be better suited
to different forms of regulation, and new factual or legal developments
may change reasonable people’s assessments about how to
accommodate the pertinent constitutional values. Part II.C then rejects
potential limitations on the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric that may
promise to better identify those statutes that prior Congresses assumed
were unconstitutional.
Antinovelty rhetoric relies on legislative novelty to infer that
Congress assumed that a statute was unconstitutional. But this
inference is misguided. Each year, thousands of bills are introduced in
the House and Senate, but only a small fraction pass.122 And for the last
thirty years, Congress has passed between 1 and 7 percent of all bills
introduced.123 In the 113th Congress, for example, there were over

120. Levinson states that, with respect to federalism, “[a]ll of the variations on the political
safeguards argument . . . share the basic assumptions that the federal government, left to its own
devices, will inexorably expand its power.” Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in
Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 940 (2005). And that account “finds a close analogy
in the way courts and theorists think about the constitutional separation of powers.” Id. at 950.
Further, “[c]ourts and theorists continue to embrace Madison’s understanding of competition
among empire-building branches.” Id.
121. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 439; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal
Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J.
2314, 2316 (2006) (“Publius’s view of separation of powers presumes three branches with
equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers, yet legislative abdication is the reigning modus
operandi.”); Levinson, supra note 120, at 951–60 (critiquing the assumption with respect to
separation of powers); id. at 942–43 (critiquing the assumption with respect to federalism).
122. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1321, 1341 (2001).
123. See Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/statistics [https://perma.cc/JX5F-36AR].
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5,500 bills introduced in the House and over 3,000 in the Senate.124 Yet
only eighty-six bills became law.125 It seems strange to assume that
Congress had serious constitutional doubts about all of the bills that
never became law (over five thousand). The same goes for the bills that
were never even introduced—Congress probably did not assume that
all of those bills were unconstitutional either. Yet the Court has shown
no regard for whether Congress even considered a statute, much less
whether it was constitutional. In Alden, for example, the Court held
that Congress lacked the power to subject unconsenting states to suits
for damages in state court, relying in part on historical materials that
did not mention bills Congress had introduced that would have done
exactly that.126
A. Enacting Federal Laws Is Difficult
Numerous institutional forces make enacting federal laws difficult
and reduce Congress’s incentives and ability to innovate, including the
Constitution’s requirements for Congress to make law, congressional
procedures, and the nature of the legislative function.
1. Constitutionally Prescribed Lawmaking Procedures. The
Constitution requires a set of cumbersome procedures to enact federal
law.127 Article I, Section 7 requires that all federal legislation go
through the process of bicameralism and presentment.128 To become
law, a bill must pass both houses of Congress; be presented to the
President for her approval; and, if vetoed, have the consent of twothirds of both the House and the Senate.
Inherent to this process are three features, all of which make it
hard to enact federal law. First, the Senate, the House, and the
President are three different institutions. A majority of persons in any
one of those institutions—potentially a minority of lawmakers—could

124. CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/search?q={%22congress%22:%22113%22,
%22chamber%22:%22House%22,%22type%22:%22bills%22}&pageSort=documentNumber:
desc [https://perma.cc/86N2-HNT9] (House); CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/search?
q={%22congress%22:%22113% 22,%22chamber%22:%22Senate%22,%22type%22:%22bills%
22}&pageSort=documentNumber:desc [https://perma.cc/Z8EV-RBNV] (Senate).
125. Public Laws, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/public-laws/113th-congress
[https://perma.cc/AUN9-3TZR].
126. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999).
127. See John F. Manning, Continuity and the Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1863, 1868 (2004).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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prohibit a bill from becoming a law.129 The process of “[b]icameralism
and presentment . . . disclose[s] an unmistakable emphasis—to give
minorities, in general . . . exceptional power to block legislation as a
means of defense against self-interested majorities.”130 Second, the
Senate, the House, and the President answer to different
constituencies, further increasing the possibility that these institutions
will disagree with one another with respect to any given federal law.131
Third, both the Senate and the House are collective bodies composed
of individuals. The Senate has 100 members, and the House has 435.
The sheer size and diversity of the House and the Senate thus make
coordinated action difficult.132 “Congress is a plural body” and “faces
substantial collective action problems.”133
The cumbersome nature of the lawmaking process was recognized
by the men who drafted the Constitution.134 Madison described
bicameralism and presentment as a “complicated check on legislation”
that “may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial.”135
Indeed, Madison objected to giving all states equal representation in
the Senate precisely because it would enable “the minority [to]
negative the will of the majority.”136 Hamilton too explained that
129. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74–75
(2001) (“[B]icameralism effectively adopts a supermajority requirement.”); Michael B.
Rappaport, Amending the Constitution to Establish Fiscal Supermajority Rules, 13 J.L. & POL.
705, 712 (1997) (“It is well known that bicameralism functions like a supermajority
requirement.”).
130. Manning, supra note 129, at 76; see also Clark, supra note 122, at 1340 (identifying Senate
structure as a source of the supermajority requirement).
131. See U.S. CONST. art. I; see also William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice:
Arrow’s Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies,
1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 956 (“Given that members of the House and Senate represent different
constituencies and given that these bodies must concur on a proposed law, a supermajority . . . is
in effect required for much of the legislation approved by Congress.”).
132. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 132, 144 (1999) (“Congress is made up of hundreds of members . . . . Although all
have a common stake in the institutional power of Congress, this is a collective good that, for wellknown reasons, can only weakly motivate their behavior.”).
133. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 440.
134. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 64–65 (1988) (“As Madison said in Federalist No. 10, the
cumbersome process of legislation is the best safeguard against error.”).
135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 418 (James Madison) (James E. Cooke ed., 1961). Madison
also said, “[A] senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from and dividing
the power with a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the
security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies . . . .” Id.
136. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 9 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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bicameralism and presentment “include[d] [the power] of preventing
good [laws].”137
2. Congressional Procedures. Under Article I, Section 5, Congress
also has the power to prescribe internal rules governing the lawmaking
process.138 The rules that Congress has made add another set of
encumbrances to the lawmaking process. A series of “veto gates”—
opportunities for a minority of legislators to veto legislation—make it
more difficult to enact federal law.139 For example:
In each house of Congress, a subcommittee and a full committee have
“gatekeeping” rights in that a bill normally cannot be considered by
the entire legislative body until it has been approved in committee.
Then, legislation must be given a position on the legislative calendar
and often must secure a special rule restricting debate or amendments
(or both) from the Rules Committee . . . .140

The committee process in particular means that a committee chair
has the power to schedule hearings, votes, and markup sessions, such
that “if the chair opposes the bill, believes more study is needed . . . or
is pessimistic . . . that the bill has sufficient political support . . . the bill
will die in committee.”141 “This is the fate of ninety percent of the bills
introduced in each session of Congress.”142 Senators can also use
filibusters or holds to block bills.143 “[A] maze of obstacles stands in the
way of each congressional decision,” and “[e]very single veto point
must be overcome if Congress is to act.”144
137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (James E. Cooke ed., 1961).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”).
139. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. L.J. 705, 707 & n.5 (1992); see Moe & Howell, supra note 132, at 146.
140. McNollgast, supra note 139, at 720–21; see also Easterbrook, supra note 134, at 64–65
(“They must run the gamut of the process—and process is the essence of legislation.”); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1442–43 (2008)
(discussing how complicated the federal legislative process is).
141. Eskridge, supra note 140, at 1444.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Moe & Howell, supra note 132, at 146. Professors Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R.
Weingast also explain:
The Rules Committee in the House may refuse to grant a rule for a committee bill,
thereby scuttling it. The Speaker may use his power to schedule legislation and to
control debate in ways detrimental to the prospects of a committee bill. A small group
of senators in the U.S. Senate may engage in filibuster and other forms of obstruction.
Any individual senator may refuse unanimous consent to procedures that would
expedite passage of a committee bill. In short, veto groups are pervasive in
legislatures . . . .
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3. The Legislative Function. Various features inherent to the
legislative process also make enacting federal laws difficult. First,
legislatures have a finite amount of time and resources to address a vast
number of subjects.145 Congress is not always in session, and when it is,
it has a limited set of resources—committee staff, research services,
political capital, and others—to invest in the many steps it takes for a
bill to become law. “Often proposals with wide support fail . . . because
the legislature [simply] lacks the time to enact them.”146 Some measures
may “have a stronger claim on the limited time and energy of the
[legislative] body.”147
Second, beyond a lack of time and resources, there are many other
reasons for legislators not to enact a law, including ordinary politics.148
Legislators may believe that a “bill is sound in principle but politically
inexpedient to be connected with.”149 Or legislators may believe that
“action should be withheld until the problem can be attacked on a
broader front.”150 Political science scholarship has identified reelection
as a significant motivation for many members of Congress,151 and
legislators motivated by reelection have incentives to follow the wishes
of their constituents, “who are concerned more with specific policy
outcomes [rather] than congressional power.”152
Political scientists have offered other explanations for why
regulatory legislation may fail to pass at any given time. As Professors
Jody Freeman and David Spence explain, “Rational choice
models . . . conceive of the legislative process as the product of
pressure exerted by interest groups” who “may be able to use their
advantages to kill or forestall regulatory legislation,” whereas
“organization theorists conceive of the policy process as far more

Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 89 (1987).
145. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983) (explaining
that “[t]he foremost of . . . checks” on a legislative body’s power “is time”).
146. Id. at 539.
147. Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory
Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 190 (1989).
148. Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 317, 335–36 (2005).
149. Marshall, supra note 147, at 190.
150. Id.
151. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 5 (1990) (“Although
[members of Congress] are not single-minded seekers of reelection, reelection is their dominant
goal.”).
152. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 442.
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anarchic—the product of inertia, luck, and other forces.”153 Although
any one of these theories cannot model congressional behavior all of
the time, the theories probably explain Congress’s behavior at least
some of the time. And they provide reasons why Congress sometimes
may not enact a bill even if it does not assume that bill is
unconstitutional.
Third, the compromises that go into lawmaking may sometimes
minimize the number and scope of federal laws that are enacted.
Textualists have emphasized “behind-the-scenes legislative
compromise[s]” that are part of lawmaking.154 Sometimes, the
brokered compromise may be to not enact any federal law. Lawmakers
make deals to support one piece of legislation at the expense
of
another:
“Often
proposals
with
wide
support
fail . . . because . . . agreed-on bills become pawns in larger
struggles.”155 Other times, a compromise may affect the shape that a
federal statute takes, which may result in a federal law that is more
limited in scope than the Constitution permits.156
*

*

*

The Court’s antinovelty rhetoric assumes that Congress will
always seek to exercise the full scope of its constitutional powers. But
that assumption does not properly consider how Congress is structured
or how it actually works. Congress’s inaction is, at best, a weak proxy
for Congress’s assumption that a federal statute is unconstitutional. As
Justice Scalia wrote:
[O]ne must ignore rudimentary principles of political science to draw
any conclusions regarding [congressional] intent from the failure to
enact legislation. The “complicated check on legislation” erected by
our Constitution creates an inertia that makes it impossible to assert
with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act

153. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
11–12 (2014).
154. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 33, 38 (2006) (emphasis omitted).
155. Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 539.
156. See Manning, supra note 129, at 77. Professor John Manning also stated:
The minority’s power to veto legislation carries with it the lesser power to insist, as the
price of assent, upon less than what the bill’s proponents ideally would desire—and,
perhaps, less than what a reasonable person would view as a fully coherent approach
to the mischief sought to be remedied.
Id.
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represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability
to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the
status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political
cowardice.157

B. Noncongressional Sources of Novelty
The previous section described how legislative novelty sometimes
results from reasons inherent to the federal legislative process. This
section outlines noncongressional sources of novelty—additional

157. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671–72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia was criticizing the Court for concluding that Congress’s
failure to amend a statute was evidence that Congress agreed with a Supreme Court decision
interpreting that statute. If legislative inaction is a weak proxy for Congress’s assumptions about
the meaning of the Constitution, legislative inaction should also be a weak proxy for Congress’s
assumptions about the meaning of a statute. In both cases, many different reasons might explain
legislative inaction. Three doctrines—the acquiescence doctrine, the reenactment doctrine, and
the rejected-proposal doctrine—infer something about Congress’s assumptions regarding a
statute from Congress’s inaction. Under the acquiescence doctrine, if “Congress is aware of an
authoritative agency or judicial interpretation of a statute and does not amend the statute, the
Court has sometimes presumed that Congress has ‘acquiesced’ in the interpretation’s
correctness.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES
BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 854 (5th ed. 2014).
Under the reenactment rule, “[i]f Congress reenacts a statute without making any material
changes in its wording, the Court will often presume that Congress intends to incorporate
authoritative agency and judicial interpretations of that language.” Id. And under the rejectedproposal rule, “[i]f Congress (in conference committee) or one chamber (on the floor) considers
and rejects specific statutory language, the Court has often been reluctant to interpret the statute
along lines of the rejected language.” Id.; see, e.g., Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Night, 543
U.S. 50, 63 (2004) (drawing an “analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘dog that didn’t bark’”); id.
at 73 (calling it the “Canon of Canine Silence”).
Whether these doctrines make too much of legislative inaction is beyond the scope of this
Article; statutory interpretation may reasonably differ from constitutional interpretation. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 108–22 (1988)
(discussing a defense of some iterations of these doctrines). The reenactment and rejectedproposal rules may be different in that they draw an inference from legislative action (enacting a
statute) that also happens to include some inaction (not amending language, either through
responding to judicial or agency decisions or other representatives’ proposals), rather than an
inference simply from inaction (not enacting a statute). Only the acquiescence rule makes
something solely of legislative inaction. Perhaps for this reason, Justice Scalia was particularly
critical of it while on the Court. See infra note 255; see also BRYAN A. GARNER & ANTONIN
SCALIA, READING LAW 326 (2012) (disavowing the acquiescence rule in cases of nonexistent
legislative amendments, but agreeing that “statutes adopted after” certain kinds of “prior judicial
or administrative interpretations” may acquiesce in those interpretations). But even with the
acquiescence rule, there is some precipitating event that purportedly, and somewhat plausibly,
generates Congress’s attention—namely, a sufficiently important judicial or agency interpretation
of a congressional statute. That may not be the case for the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric because
there may be no precipitating event that might plausibly catch Congress’s attention.

LITMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

DEBUNKING ANTINOVELTY

4/11/2017 9:03 AM

1435

reasons why Congress may not enact statutes aside from thinking that
those statutes are unconstitutional.
1. Judicial Decisions. Judicial interpretations of the Constitution
may affect how Congress legislates. Given the amount of resources and
time required to enact a federal statute, Congress may attempt to enact
statutes that are likely to be upheld. Accordingly, judicial decisions—
specifically, what federal judges have said about what statutes might be
unconstitutional—may incentivize Congress to avoid enacting federal
statutes that test the limits of its constitutional powers.158
Consider, for example, the legislative history of the 2006
reauthorization of the VRA. Originally enacted in 1965, the VRA
required nine states to preclear any changes to their voting laws.159
Between 1965 and 2006, the VRA had been upheld on three
occasions.160 Since those decisions, however, the Court announced a
more rigorous form of scrutiny applicable to legislation that was
enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment.161 Congress, in deciding
how to reauthorize the VRA, elected to stick with a version of the
preclearance regime that had previously been upheld. Testimony in
congressional hearings and congressional debates reflected the focus
on reauthorizing a version of the VRA that would be upheld in court.162

158. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), the Court reasoned that Congress legislates in
response to judicial decisions:
To the extent recent practice . . . departs from longstanding tradition, it reflects not so
much an understanding that the States have surrendered their immunity from suit in
their own courts as the erroneous view, perhaps inspired by [the Supreme Court’s
decisions in] Parden and Union Gas, that Congress may subject nonconsenting States
to private suits in any forum.
Id. at 745.
159. For a summary, see Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1207, 1208–09 (2016).
160. Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 283–85 (1999); City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 159, 178–83 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334–35 (1966).
161. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For an explanation of the intervening
legal challenges to the VRA, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the
Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177
(2005).
162. See An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues
Relating to Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2006)
(statement of Richard L. Hasen, Professor, Loyola Law School) (focusing on the necessity of
passing a bill that “will . . . pass constitutional muster in the Supreme Court”). The first question
that Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter asked Professor Richard Pildes to
answer at length was, “Is there anything that Congress can do to ensure that the reauthorization
of the Voting Rights Act is upheld by the Supreme Court under the ‘congruence and
proportionality’ test articulated in City of Boerne v. Flores?” The Continuing Need for Section 5
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As Professor Nathaniel Persily explained, “Even though the
shortcomings . . . were widely recognized, tinkering with its basic
architecture was . . . constitutionally risky. Better to stick with a law
that the Court had previously upheld . . . rather than gamble on a
regime without stare decisis.”163
Commandeering may be another example of how statutes
sometimes reflect Congress’s reticence to test judges’ interpretations
of the Constitution, rather than reflecting Congress’s own assumptions
about the Constitution. In Printz, the Court reasoned that Congress’s
history of not requiring states to enforce federal laws signaled
Congress’s assumption that it lacked the power to do so.164 But the lack
of analogous statutes instead might have reflected Congress’s concern
that the Court would invalidate a statute requiring states to enforce
federal law. In an 1842 decision, Prigg v. Pennsylvania,165 the Court
held that the Fugitive Slave Act was a constitutional exercise of
Congress’s powers under the Fugitive Slave Clause.166 Prigg, however,
suggested the statute would have exceeded Congress’s powers if it had
pressed state executives into implementing federal law: “The states
cannot . . . be compelled to enforce” federal law, “and it might well be
deemed an unconstitutional exercise . . . to insist that the states are
bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national
government.”167 During this time period, the Supreme Court also
considered the possibility that Congress could not impress state judicial
officers into service,168 but it rejected that idea in the early 1900s.169 The
Pre-clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 105 (2006) (statement
of Richard H. Pildes, Professor, New York University School of Law) (emphasis omitted); see
H.R. Rep. 109-478, at 93 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 618, 678 (focusing on the VRA’s
constitutionality and noting that the VRA was previously upheld).
163. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act (VRA), 117
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 139, 140 (2007), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-promise-andpitfalls-of-the-new-voting-rights-act-vra [http://perma.cc/B7E3-FVZU]; see Nathaniel Persily,
The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 211 (2007) (“Whatever
its drawbacks, the current coverage formula had the virtue of already having been upheld by the
Supreme Court.”).
164. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
165. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
166. Id. at 624.
167. Id. at 615–16.
168. Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1046
(1995); Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545, 581–
84 (1925) (describing Supreme Court cases intimating that Congress could not impress state
judicial officers into service).
169. Second Employers’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912); Caminker, supra note 168, at 1023–
28.
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Court’s suggestion that Congress could not commandeer state
executive officers—a suggestion that went unchallenged in Supreme
Court opinions for over a century—may partially explain the greater
number of federal statutes commandeering state judges than state
executive officers.
The Reconstruction Amendments are another example of how
judicial decisions may limit Congress’s incentives to test the limits of
its constitutional powers, especially when there are other, judicially
sanctioned means of pursuing Congress’s desired goal. In 1883, in The
Civil Rights Cases,170 the Court held that the Reconstruction
Amendments did not provide Congress with the power to prohibit
racial discrimination in private establishments.171 Congress did not
attempt to reenact any laws prohibiting racial discrimination by private
entities for several decades,172 but when the civil rights movement
gained traction in the 1960s, The Civil Rights Cases remained on the
books. But in a series of 1940s decisions, the Supreme Court held that
Congress could pass laws under its Commerce Clause authority
regulating even purely intrastate commerce and that the Court would
not inquire into Congress’s “motives” in enacting such legislation.173
Relying on these decisions, the Supreme Court upheld congressional
legislation prohibiting racial discrimination by private entities under
the Commerce Clause.174 It would be strange to think that these cases
did not affect the way in which federal antidiscrimination legislation
was enacted. The doctrine has evolved in such a way that Congress has
little incentive to challenge the proposition that it cannot prohibit
racial discrimination by private entities under the Reconstruction
Amendments, because it can enact such legislation under the
Commerce Clause.
2. Precipitating Changes. Congress also enacts new statutes
because of changing conditions that did not previously exist. Congress
enacts laws in response to existing conditions, and Congress now
regulates in more domains than it did one hundred or two hundred

170. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
171. Id. at 15, 25.
172. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 512–28 (1988)
(describing how political moderates lost the will to police southern states).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114–15 (1941).
174. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(same).
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years ago. Various facts about the world have changed, such as the
interconnectedness of the economy and the formation of political
parties, and the federal bureaucracy is now more substantial in size and
authority. In light of these changes, the absence of a federal statute may
reflect nothing more than Congress’s belief that a particular kind of law
was not needed or even its members’ lack of imagination.
a. New or Changed Facts. One reason why Congress may not have
previously enacted similar statutes is that new or changed facts have
brought a new issue to Congress’s attention or changed the need for
legislation. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority175
addressed whether Congress may apply the federal minimum-wage
requirement to state and local government employees.176 In the late
1980s and early 1990s, when the Court decided Garcia, state and local
government employees constituted around 12 to 13 percent of the
civilian workforce.177 A century earlier, however, government
employees—local, state, and federal—constituted less than 1 percent
of the national workforce.178 Even in 1900, these government
employees constituted only 4 percent of the national workforce, and in
1930, state and local employees constituted less than 6 percent of the
national workforce.179 As state and local employees became an
increasingly significant portion of the workforce, federal employee
regulation began to cover state and local employees. State and local
employees were no longer “small pockets of isolated workers whose
conditions d[id] not affect interstate commerce.”180
175. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
176. Id. at 554.
177. Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power,
and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1733–34 (1990) (book review) (citing
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 293, 380 (109th ed. 1989) (noting there were
13,913,000 state and local government workers among the 109,597,000 persons employed in the
civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 and over).
178. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789–1945, at 64 ser. D. 47-61 (1949), http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/
documents/HistoricalStatisticsoftheUnitedStates1789-1945.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WTZ-5NUN]
(showing that there were 12,920,000 gainful workers in 1870, with all governmental employees
amounting to only 100,000).
179. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION, pt. 5, at 137 ser. D 127-141
(1975), http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p1-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BK2P-T22S] (showing that nonagricultural governmental employees totaled 1,094,000 in 1900
and 2,371,000 in 1920); id. at 128 ser. D 11-25, at 128 (showing that the civilian labor force totaled
51,251,000 in 1900 and 87,981,000 in 1930).
180. Laycock, supra note 177, at 1733–34.
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b. Changed Assessment of Facts. Apart from whether the
underlying facts have actually changed, Congress’s assessment of the
facts may have changed. Take federal commandeering of state
executive officers. The Court in Printz relied on the lack of historical
evidence to conclude that Congress assumed it lacked the power to
impress state officers into federal service. But “[v]arious Framers
(including Hamilton) commented that the coercion of states would
likely prove impractical or ineffective at best and dangerous because
divisive at worst.”181 Hamilton, for example, worried that state
administration of federal law “w[ould] in a great measure fail in the
execution.”182 Decisionmakers two hundred years ago may not have
required states to execute federal law because they did not believe the
states could adequately execute it.
c. New Areas for Regulation. Some novel statutes may also arise
because Congress controls more regulatory spheres today than it did
one hundred or two hundred years ago. New industries have emerged,
and some older industries were not always regulated at the federal
level. To take just a few examples, nuclear weapons, the Internet,
telephones, genetically modified food, and driverless cars (or even just
cars) did not exist in the first fifty years of the United States. Before
these technologies and their associated industries existed, Congress
could not regulate them. Congress also now regulates in industries or
domains that have long existed but have not always been regulated at
the federal level. Before the 1900s, Congress did not regulate much
intrastate economic activity under the Commerce Clause.183 But today
Congress regulates home-grown drugs,184 small places of public

181. Caminker, supra note 168, at 1048; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 97 (Alexander
Hamilton) (James E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot
be executed without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will be little prospect
of their being executed at all.”); Madison, supra note 136, at 9 (“The practicability of making laws,
with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands.”).
182. LINDA GRANT DE PAUW, THE ELEVENTH PILLAR: NEW YORK STATE AND THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 33–34 (1966).
183. See Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 601–02 (2014)
(discussing the direct–indirect distinction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
184. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
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accommodations,185 loan sharking,186 and insurance.187 Indeed, some
maintain there is now no sphere of authority in which Congress may
not reach under its commerce power or another one of its delegated
powers.188
Changed facts present a clear example of why antinovelty rhetoric
should not apply when the novel legislation deals with a new area of
regulation. If particular areas of regulation—the Internet, nuclear
weapons, or certain pollutants—did not exist, then of course the fact
that Congress did not regulate those areas before their existence
should not mean that Congress lacks the power to regulate. Changed
facts arguably pose less of an issue for the antinovelty principle in cases
involving new forms of congressional legislation. New facts may not
support the claim that Congress can now exercise its powers in ways it
previously did not, even if new facts may support the claim that
Congress can exercise its powers in previously unregulated areas.
But changed facts cause Congress to exercise its powers in new
ways, in part because new facts generate new areas of regulation, and
new areas of regulation may require new forms of regulation. The
industries and activities that Congress regulates today differ in
important ways, so they present different regulatory issues than those
that Congress faced in 1800. And new regulatory forms may not have
been suited to the areas in which Congress previously regulated. For
example, in the late 1700s and early 1800s, Congress regulated the
production and consumption of salt189 and “snuff and refined sugar”
through import duties.190 That may have been the best regulatory tool
for salt and sugar, but the regulation of salt and sugar poses different
issues than the regulation of driverless cars, telephones, loan sharking,
and the provision of public accommodations.

185. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 249–50 (1964).
186. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
187. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 542–45 (1944) (holding that
Congress may regulate the insurance industry despite stating in prior cases that insurance was not
interstate commerce), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1970).
188. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 318 (rev. ed. 2014); cf. Primus, supra note 183, at 579 (“[F]or much of the twentieth
century, many people suspected that internal limits had lost all practical significance.”).
189. Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 43, 2 Stat. 60 (repealed 1807) (continuing “[a]n act laying an
additional duty on Salt imported into the United States, and for other purposes”).
190. Act of Feb. 25, 1801, ch. 11, 2 Stat. 102 (repealed 1802) (continuing “the act laying certain
duties on snuff and refined sugar”).
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d. New Policy Goal. Within any given area of regulation, there are
potentially infinite policy goals to pursue, and different policies may
call for different regulatory tools. That a regulation is new, therefore,
may reflect that Congress has not elected to pursue a particular policy
goal within an area in which it has long regulated. Take, for example,
federal housing law, which addresses myriad regulatory goals. Some
federal laws attempt to remedy unsafe housing conditions.191 Others try
to expand the number of homes available to Native American
families,192 and still others prohibit discrimination in the sale, rental, or
provision of housing related services.193 And Congress has elected to
pursue these different goals using different means. For example, as part
of an effort to reduce lead-based paint, Congress directed the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to incorporate the need to
reduce lead-based paint hazards into underwriting, insurance, and
mortgage appraisals.194 The program providing housing assistance for
Native Americans, by contrast, requires consultation with Native
American tribes before granting funds and approving plans created by
eligible housing authorities.195 As part of its policy to ban housing
discrimination, Congress funded an education initiative as well as
private programs to investigate and test compliance with the law.196 As
these examples indicate, different regulatory tools are appropriate for
different policies. The mere fact that Congress has regulated a
particular area, such as housing, does not mean that it has exhausted
the full set of regulatory options available within that sphere. As
Congress’s regulatory priorities and goals change, so too will its choice
of regulatory tools. And given the sheer number of policies that it could
conceivably pursue, Congress may not have tried out all forms of
constitutionally permissible regulation.
e. New Forms of Regulation. New forms of congressional
regulation may themselves result in additional kinds of statutory
novelty. A new form of regulation may lead to a new kind of
enforcement proceeding becoming available by statute. Consider
federal regulation of state governments: federal regulations began to
impose obligations on states as employers and created opportunities
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1)(A) (2012); id. § 1441b.
25 U.S.C. § 4101 (2012).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–06.
Id. § 4852a(c)(1), (c)(5).
25 U.S.C. §§ 4112–13.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3616a(b)(2), (d).
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for individuals to enforce federal statutory obligations against states. A
new kind of federal regulation thus generated a different kind of
federal enforcement proceeding: suits for damages for violations of
federal law against the states.
Cooperative-federalism programs, in which Congress works with
states in some fashion, provide another example of how new kinds of
federal regulations may generate new kinds of enforcement
proceedings.197 Cooperative-federalism programs differ from one
another in several ways. They impose myriad conditions on state and
local governments for accepting federal funds, and they use a variety
of incentives and mechanisms to encourage states to regulate in
accordance with federal goals.198 The sheer variety of conditions in
these programs generates many different possible federal enforcement
mechanisms. The Court in VOPA acknowledged this when it held that
an independent state agency vested with federal rights could sue other
state officials for prospective injunctive relief. Dismissing the idea that
the suit’s novelty indicated that the suit was not constitutionally
permissible, the Court explained the requirements for such a suit to
arise:
[A] state agency needs two things: first, a federal right that it possesses
against its parent state; and second, authority to sue other state
officials to enforce that right . . . . These conditions will rarely
coincide . . . . Thus, the apparent novelty of this sort of suit does not
at all suggest its unconstitutionality.199

New forms of regulation may also generate new kinds of ancillary
regulations. Sometimes Congress enacts a regulatory scheme with
mutually reinforcing provisions or provisions designed to address
effects caused by other statutory provisions. In United States v.
Comstock,200 for example, the Court explained that federal criminal
prohibitions may generate other, ancillary regulations, including
establishing federal prisons and regulating those prisons to ensure “the

197. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in
Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 584–88 (2011) (describing different variations on
cooperative-federalism programs).
198. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense
of the Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L.J. 248, 259 (2014) (explaining federal grant conditions and
mechanisms for enforcing compliance).
199. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 260–61 (2011).
200. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
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safety of the prisoners, prison workers and visitors, and those in
surrounding communities.”201
f. Changed Accommodation of Constitutional Values. Novelty
may also be the result of Congress’s changed assessment of the relevant
constitutional values. Congress may accommodate constitutional
values like state autonomy in different ways.202 Congress may promote
state autonomy by not legislating at all: if Congress does not enact
federal law, the states can make policy and realize the goals of state
autonomy, such as better-informed local decisionmakers, regulatory
diversity, and opportunity for local political engagement.203 But
Congress may also preserve state autonomy by allowing states to
implement federal law, by partnering federal agencies with state
counterparts to administer federal law, or by offering states money to
achieve regulatory goals.204
Relatedly, the contours of state autonomy and the separation of
powers are susceptible to change because there are competing
constitutional values for Congress to reconcile with state autonomy
and the separation of powers. State autonomy is one constitutional
value, but so is national supremacy.205 Similarly, the separation of
powers is one constitutional value, but so is the idea of checks and
balances among the different branches of government.206 Congress
may, therefore, strike the balance between these cross-cutting values
in different places at different points in time. When it has struck the
balance at any particular point in the past thus may not reveal every
possible permissible balancing of those constitutional values.
Finally, new or changed features of government may also offer
new ways of realizing constitutional values. For example, the advent of
political parties has provided a new vehicle for realizing state

201. Id. at 136–37, 142.
202. See generally Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733 (2005) (explaining
how judges could compensate for anti-federalist developments by developing pro-federalist
doctrines).
203. See Primus, supra note 183, at 587–91 (explaining this argument).
204. Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the OldFashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1751–52 (2013).
205. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation,
122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2055 (2009).
206. Leah M. Litman, Taking Care of Federal Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1289, 1352–53 (2015);
John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939,
1971–77 (2011).
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autonomy as well as the separation of powers. “Today’s polarized
parties furnish” an additional means for how and “why states would
check the federal government.”207 And although the advent of political
parties may have eliminated some means for realizing the separation
of powers, it has offered other ways of doing so.208
g. Lawmaking Processes. The participants in the lawmaking
process have also changed. Congress is accountable to more groups
today than it was 150 or 200 years ago—the electorate now includes
different age groups,209 women,210 African Americans,211 and other
groups who did not previously vote in federal elections. Congress also
now enacts statutes to regulate alongside administrative agencies that
exercise delegated lawmaking authority from Congress.212 There are
also increasingly polarized political parties.213 “[U]northodox drafters
outside of government” may generate new ideas for federal laws.214
New participants in the lawmaking process may also provide new
possibilities for whom Congress may select to implement federal law,
leading to new kinds or forms of regulation as new entities are charged
with implementing federal law.
Another aspect of the lawmaking process that has changed is the
ways in which laws are made. It was initially expected that the Senate
would spend significant amounts of time in recess and that Congress
might not meet every year.215 The first ten Senate sessions lasted
approximately seven or eight months.216 It was not until the late 1880s

207. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1090 (2014).
208. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2006).
209. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
210. Id. amend. XIX.
211. Id. amend. XV.
212. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369, 369 (1989).
213. Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 386 (1997).
214. Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking,
Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1823 (2015); see generally Christopher J.
Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (describing agencies’
role in the legislative process).
215. See, e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom.
Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). Compare U.S. CONST. art. I (“The Congress shall assemble
at least once in every year . . . .”), with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. IX, para. 7
(requiring no period of adjournment be longer than six months).
216. JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, 113TH CONG., 2013–2014 OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL
DIRECTORY 524 (Comm. Print 2013).
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that Congress had a session that exceeded three hundred days.217 The
Senate’s “first serious controvers[y] over ‘obstructive’ uses of
debate”—precursors to the filibuster—“occurred . . . [in] the 1820s.”218
The Senate did not “establish a right of unlimited debate until 1856,”219
and Congress did not develop a system of committees specialized in
subject matter until the mid-1800s. Before that, there were two
Committees of the Whole.220
In part because of political polarization, the lawmaking process—
at least when it results in the enactment of federal laws—has begun to
move away from the labyrinth of committees that were once thought
of as hallmarks of the legislative process. “[I]n the first year of the 112th
Congress, fewer than 10% of enacted laws proceeded through the
‘textbook’ legislative process.”221 Indeed, the lawmaking process has
changed so much that some scholars have observed “that the
Schoolhouse Rock! cartoon version of the conventional legislative
process is dead.”222 For example, “legislative bundling through
omnibus vehicles has increased dramatically . . . omnibus packages
have made up about 12% of major legislation.”223
The recent uptick in political polarization, coupled with these new
lawmaking procedures, has generated new forms of legislation.
Political polarization sometimes means that parties are unable to come
to any agreement and enact federal law.224 But political polarization
also results in different kinds of laws than ones that were produced in
less polarized times. “In the rare political moments where Congress
produces legislation, the legislation tends to be sprawling and, at least
according to some, ill-conceived or even ‘incoherent’—a trend toward
what one recent article calls ‘hyper-legislation.’”225 Different kinds of
agency authority may be appealing to Congress in times of gridlock,
such as “administrative forbearance authority—by which Congress

217. Id. at 528.
218. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 189–90
(1997).
219. Id. at 190.
220. Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of Deliberative
Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 321, 327–28 (1994).
221. Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 214, at 1800.
222. Id. at 1794. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING (1997)
(arguing that the conventional model no longer adequately captures the legislative process).
223. Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 214, at 1800 (emphasis omitted).
224. See, e.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note 153, at 15–16.
225. Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548, 1557 (2016).
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grants agencies the express power to deprive the laws it passes of legal
force and effect.”226 Polarization may also lead Congress to make new
or additional delegations to states: “Particularly in times of divided
government, some members of Congress might trust their home-state
counterparts more than the administrative appointees of the President
to fill in the interstices of new federal programs.”227
h. Areas Versus Means? Perhaps antinovelty rhetoric is more
appealing when invoked in cases addressing new forms of regulation,
rather than new areas of regulation. It may seem obvious to infer that
if new facts develop, then Congress’s failure to regulate in that area
does not and should not mean that Congress lacks the constitutional
authority to regulate. Similarly, perhaps new facts do not support the
claim that Congress can now exercise its powers in new ways. Even
then, the other reasons why lack of constitutional authority does not
follow from Congress not enacting a statute may also suggest that
Congress’s failure to enact a statute does not reflect its assumption that
it lacks the constitutional power to enact that kind of regulation.
Bicameralism and presentment, together with Congress’s own rules
about its procedures, make enacting federal law difficult and increase
Congress’s incentive to enact minimal, low-risk statutes that do not risk
other lawmakers’ opposition, such as enacting statutes that resemble
prior statutes. Enacting federal statutes that use the same form or
means of regulation is a way of trying to ensure that those statutes are
upheld by judges.
There are other reasons why it is unlikely that Congress has
enacted all of the constitutionally permissible forms of regulation. A
new policy goal may call for a new form of regulation, and because
there are so many potential policy goals for Congress to pursue in a
given area, Congress may exercise its power within a given area in a
new way. Moreover, within any given regulatory sphere there are
myriad forms that federal regulation could take,228 and when Congress
chooses to address a particular issue, Congress will not enact every
possible law it could have enacted to address that issue. If, for example,
Congress wants to decrease the number of firearms near schools, it may
226. Id. at 1558.
227. Abbe R. Gluck, supra note 197, at 573.
228. In the constitutional convention itself, for example, one delegate explained: “We all
agree in the necessity of new regulations; but we differ widely in our opinions of what are the
safest and most effectual.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 161 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911).
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choose to enact criminal penalties for possessing a firearm near a
school. Additional ways it could accomplish this same goal would be to
offer money to the states to enact criminal penalties for possessing
firearms near schools, tax those who possess firearms near schools,
delegate rulemaking authority to an agency to determine whether to
prohibit firearms near schools, or conditionally preempt state firearms
laws if the states did not enact criminal penalties for possessing
firearms near schools. But Congress usually does not throw every
possible regulatory solution at a problem, and therefore does not enact
many constitutionally permissible means of regulation.
Moreover, it is not always clear when a statute presents a new form
of regulation as opposed to a new area of regulation. Consider the
example of NFIB. Perhaps NFIB involved a new form of regulation—
requiring individuals to purchase a particular item. But NFIB could
equally be thought of as involving a new area of regulation—the
regulation of individuals not engaged in any commerce—splicing the
antinovelty principle. Indeed, parts of the opinion invalidating the
minimum-coverage
requirement
appear
to
reflect
this
understanding.229 The same could be said of Zivotofsky, which
invalidated a statute on the ground that it infringed the President’s
recognition power.230 Did that statute intrude on an area of regulation
reserved to the executive—the recognition of foreign states—or was
the statute particularly suspect because of its form of regulation?
Finally, the premise that new facts do not lead to new forms of
regulation is wrong. Sometimes changed facts themselves generate a
new form of regulation. Take the emergence of state and local
governments as significant employers in the national workforce.
Historically, federal regulation of the workforce did not require the
direct imposition of obligations on state governments or generate suits
to enforce federal obligations against states. But the emergence of new
facts—the expansion of state and local government workforces—
generated those new forms of federal regulation. And even if new facts
only led to new industries and new areas of regulation, new areas of
regulation may cause new forms of regulation because the kinds of
229. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586–87 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) (“The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial
activity to be regulated. . . . The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing
commercial activity.”); id. at 2644 (“If this provision ‘regulates’ anything, it is the failure to
maintain minimum essential coverage. . . . [T]hat failure—that abstention from commerce—is not
‘Commerce.’”).
230. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015).

LITMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1448

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/11/2017 9:03 AM

[Vol. 66:1407

regulation Congress used to regulate other areas may not be well suited
to address whatever risks or problems a newer area poses.
C. Possible Refinements: Actual Constitutional Consensus or
Attractive Constitutional Powers?
Parts II.A and II.B outlined reasons why legislative novelty is a
poor proxy for Congress’s assumption that it lacks the constitutional
power to enact a particular statute. Instead of maintaining that all
novel statutes are constitutionally suspect, another possible approach
could be for the Court to limit the use of antinovelty rhetoric to cases
involving statutes that prior Congresses doubted they could enact. But
adoption of this approach would have far-reaching practical
consequences, may not identify the Constitution’s original meaning,
and would likely prove inadministrable. Alternatively, the Court could
potentially use Printz’s formulation, which suggested that legislative
novelty is evidence of Congress’s assumption that a statute is
unconstitutional when the statute exercises “highly attractive” powers.
But adoption of this formulation would similarly prove
inadministrable.
1. Actual Constitutional Consensus. What if the Court only used
antinovelty rhetoric in cases involving statutes that prior Congresses
did not enact because they harbored doubts about the statutes’
constitutionality? Justice Scalia arguably embraced this kind of
antinovelty principle in his dissent in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission.231 The Justice framed the question as whether “the
government conduct at issue was not engaged in at the time of
adoption, and [whether] there [was] ample evidence that the reason it
was not engaged in [was] that it was thought to violate the
[Constitution].”232 This approach to antinovelty supports the
implementation of an original understanding of the Constitution. But
if the Court relies on later Congresses’ views about a statute’s
constitutionality—in particular, Congresses in session after the first
twenty or fifty years of the United States, as the cases often do—then
it is no longer clearly about original understandings so much as the

231. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
232. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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understanding during the nation’s first quarter to half century.233 This
subsection rejects an antinovelty principle that would call into question
all federal statutes that prior Congresses assumed were
unconstitutional. That principle would be too dissonant with much of
constitutional law; would likely reveal only the expected applications
of the text, as opposed to its meaning; and would likely prove
inadministrable.
First, an approach to the antinovelty principle that calls into
question the constitutionality of all statutes that the first twenty or so
Congresses assumed were unconstitutional would have too farreaching consequences on much of constitutional law and
constitutional practice. Several constitutional rules are considered
settled by virtue of doctrine or congressional practice,234 including the
government’s ability to distribute paper money235 and to provide Social
Security.236 If constitutional disputes were to be resolved according to
the Constitution’s original meaning, there would also be questions
about various settled rules involving individual rights, such as the
prohibition on segregation in public schools,237 the prohibition on the
establishment of state churches,238 and the protections of free speech
that extend beyond a prohibition on prior restraints.239 As a matter of
original or historical understandings, these constitutional rules are
hard to justify, so the antinovelty principle would jeopardize rule-oflaw values, such as predictability and stability, as well as undermine the

233. Unless the original understanding was to delegate a decision to a subsequent Congress.
See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 527–39
(2003) (explaining the concept of liquidation).
234. Primus, supra note 113, at 177 & n.49 (“Many doctrines that are central to modern
constitutional law are not reconcilable with original constitutional meanings.”).
235. Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367, 374, 389 (1982).
236. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 733–34 (1988); see Fallon, supra note 106, at 1810 (“Full-blooded exclusive originalism
would be a nutty view.”).
237. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 3, at 2027–30 (explaining that public-school segregation would
be constitutional under a “consistent and honest application of expected-application
originalism”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response
to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881 (1995) (“[T]he overwhelming consensus
among legal academics has been that Brown cannot be defended on originalist grounds.”).
238. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term—Foreword: Does the
Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015).
239. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 124–25 (1997); Leonard W. Levy,
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 173 (1960); Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 835; Dorf, supra note 3, at 2027–30.
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substantive justice that the constitutional system delivers.240 A system
of adjudication in which judges discarded a significant amount of
doctrine and congressional practice may also be too far removed from
our own to be a viable interpretive approach to constitutional law.241
Second, the antinovelty principle may only reveal prior
Congresses’ expectations about how the text would be applied, which
most contemporary proponents of originalism reject as the lodestar for
constitutional decisionmaking. Recent scholarship on originalism has
sought to refocus originalism away from the original intent of the
Constitution’s drafters (the expected applications of the constitutional
text) to whatever principle is embodied in the Constitution’s text (the
original public or semantic meaning of the constitutional text).242 An
account of antinovelty that focuses on whether “the government
conduct . . . was thought to violate . . . the [C]onstitution”243 may reveal
only the expected applications of the text, as opposed to its fixed
meaning. Consider the cases that identify constraints on Congress’s
powers based on the structure of the Constitution or the principle of
federalism it embodies. The idea that Congress may not commandeer
state officials is probably an expected application of some piece of

240. Professor Michael Dorf has explained how undoing these decisions may undermine
individuals’ abilities to identify subjectively with the constitutional scheme. See Dorf, supra note
3, at 2030 (“Although sacrificing Sullivan and Brown would not have immediate tangible legal
consequences, these and other cases have come to stand for more than the legal doctrines they
announced. They symbolize the association in the public imagination of the Constitution with
core ideals of liberty and equality.”).
241. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case
of Original Meaning, 15 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1791–92 (1997) (explaining that a theory of constitutional
law that “depart[s] so far from what the relevant audience understands that subject to
be . . . cannot meaningfully be called theories of constitutional law”). Philip Bobbitt maintains
that constitutional arguments and theory should conform—in some general way—to how
constitutional law is practiced because lawyers’ reliance on the different modalities of
constitutional argument is what makes the arguments legitimate. PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 170–86 (1982). But Bobbitt’s explanation for why that should be the case
is not the only one. “It is one thing to argue that a practice is slightly askew, such that getting it
right requires certain reforms. But it is quite another to argue that an entire community of
practitioners is radically mistaken about the nature of its enterprise.” Primus, supra note 113, at
178.
242. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 2020 (describing new originalists as “reject[ing] original intent
in favor of original meaning”). But there is substantial variety even among new originalists. See
id. at 2019 (“The simple dichotomy between old originalism and new originalism does not begin
to capture the many variations of originalism now on offer.”). There are also different kinds of
“meaning” other than original or semantic meaning. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of
Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
1235, 1290 (2015) (identifying other kinds of meaning).
243. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 372 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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constitutional text—for instance, the Tenth Amendment or the
Necessary and Proper Clause—or the Constitution’s general structure.
It cannot be the core semantic meaning of those provisions, which say
nothing about the specific question (in the case of the Tenth
Amendment) or nothing at all (in the case of the Constitution’s
structure).
There are also reasons why it is difficult to divine the meaning of
the text from Congress’s expectations or assumptions about how the
text should be applied. An account of antinovelty that focuses on
whether “the government conduct . . . was thought to violate . . . the
[C]onstitution” may risk conflating the text’s semantic meaning with its
expected applications because attempting to disaggregate the two can
prove difficult.244 This difficulty is only exacerbated when there is
arguably no provision of the text, or very little text, that is relevant to
whatever question the judge is deciding, which is often the case for
questions of federalism or the separation of powers.245 And there may
be no epistemic reason why aggregating Congress’s expectations about
how the text should be applied would reveal the public meaning of the
text. Because Congress is a collective body, it may not be possible to
attribute a singular constitutional view to its members. Even when a
majority of Congress chooses not to enact a statute because they
assume that the statute would be unconstitutional, those members may
have different reasons for why that is. Different Justices of the
Supreme Court articulate different reasons for reaching the same
result.246 There is little reason to think that members of Congress are
meaningfully different in this respect.
Third, operationalizing a principle concerned with identifying
congressional consensus that a statute is unconstitutional would likely
prove inadministrable. It is not always clear what constitutional
decisionmakers, particularly members of Congress, mean when they

244. Dorf, supra note 3, at 2031–34 (explaining how the two can be grouped together even by
original-public-meaning originalists).
245. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism, 122
HARV. L. REV. 98, 101 (2009).
246. Compare, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010) (explaining that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits imposing life without parole on juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
offenses), with id. at 86 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (contending that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits imposing life without parole on the particular juvenile); compare E. Enters. v. Apfel,
524 U.S. 498, 522–23 (1998) (finding that the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act effected
an unconstitutional taking), with id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that the Act violated
due process but did not amount to a taking).
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express the belief that a statute is unconstitutional.247 Thus, even a
highly idealized congressional record that contains statements
regarding a statute’s constitutionality will be an imperfect proxy for
either the public meaning of the text or its expected applications. Some
constitutional arguments will be opportunistic—the reasoning will
mask political claims in the language of constitutional reasoning. Even
good-faith constitutional arguments may reflect what Professor
Richard Primus has called “constitutional expectations”—expectations
about how the constitutional system should operate, rather than a
judgment about the requirements of the constitutional text.248 That is,
rather than revealing Congress’s understanding about the
requirements of the constitutional text, some constitutional claims may
instead reflect how participants in the system expected things to work,
given the underlying conditions at the time as well as their common
experiences and socialization. And extrapolating what members of
earlier Congresses thought in light of current conditions, experience,
and socialization is, essentially, asking how individuals would resolve
the matter in those moments.249
2. Attractive Powers. Writing for the majority in Printz, Justice
Scalia maintained that if “earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly
attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was
thought not to exist.”250 No case after Printz even included this possible
limit on the Court’s approach to legislative novelty. But what if the
Court stuck with this approach and inferred that the absence of similar
statutes reflected Congress’s assumption that a statute was
unconstitutional only if that statute exercised “highly attractive”
powers—that is, powers Congress would have wanted to exercise?
The problem with an “attractive powers” limit may be in its
administration. The Supreme Court’s own application of this version
of antinovelty rhetoric provides reason to be skeptical of judges’
abilities to discern when a statute was “highly attractive” to

247. See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1104–28
(2013) (suggesting that a label of constitutionality traffics in different ideas).
248. See id. at 1107 (“[O]ur constitutional expectations have the power to divert our attention
from the words in the text.”).
249. Klarman, supra note 213, at 395–96 (explaining that those who try to “translate”
constitutional texts to modern times “adjust the Framers’ constitutional commitments to reflect
changed circumstances, but fail to ask whether the Framers would have remained committed to
the same concepts had they been aware of future circumstances”).
250. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
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contemporary Congresses and when Congress has not enacted a statute
because it assumed that the statute was unconstitutional. In Printz,
Justice Scalia reasoned that “the utter lack of statutes imposing
obligations on the states’ executive (notwithstanding the attractiveness
of that course to Congress), suggests an assumed absence of such
power.”251 But the idea that impressing state officers into service was
“attractive” to Congress is doubtful if not plainly wrong—proponents
of federal power did not want to rely on state officers to enforce federal
law in part because of concerns about the state officers’ competence.
Moreover, there are still too many reasons why Congress might not
enact laws exercising “attractive” powers to infer that Congress
assumed such statutes were unconstitutional.
*

*

*

This Part has focused on debunking the first step in the Court’s
antinovelty rhetoric—namely, the claim that legislative novelty
suggests that prior Congresses believed that a statute was
unconstitutional. But the antinovelty rhetoric includes another
questionable assumption: that prior Congresses’ assumptions about a
statute’s constitutionality do or should affect whether a statute is
unconstitutional. The Court has never explained why prior Congresses’
assumptions matter to whether a statute is unconstitutional.
Antinovelty rhetoric might also be rejected on the basis of an
explanation about why Congresses’ assumptions about a statute’s
constitutionality purportedly matter to a statute’s ultimate
constitutionality. For example, one might argue that a prior Congress’s
assumption that a statute is unconstitutional means that the statute is
unconstitutional because, if Congress assumes something to be true,
then it is true. That does not seem right, however, because Congress
makes mistakes. It makes drafting errors,252 and it enacts statutes that
are plainly inconsistent with current doctrine253 or the original meaning
of the Constitution’s text.254
Perhaps Congress’s belief that a statute is unconstitutional is some
evidence that a statute is unconstitutional. But either way, these
251. Id. at 907–08 (first emphasis added).
252. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2459 n.265
(2003) (citing examples of likely scrivener’s errors).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 460 (2010) (invalidating a statute that
criminalized certain depictions of animal cruelty).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 231–41.
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formulations are arguably inconsistent with some Justices’ refusal to
consider Congress’s assumptions in statutory interpretation cases.
These Justices maintain that Congress’s purpose is not relevant to the
meaning of a statute, and yet antinovelty rhetoric maintains that
Congress’s assumptions about the meaning of the constitutional text
are in fact relevant to the meaning of that text.255
III. ACTUAL CONSTITUTIONALITY, VIEWS OF BRANCHES, AND
CONDUCT OF BRANCHES: A NEW JUSTIFICATION?
The previous Part primarily focused on why legislative novelty
does not suggest that prior Congresses assumed that a statute was
unconstitutional. Perhaps because legislative novelty does not reliably
signal Congress’s assumptions about the Constitution, more recent
cases have adopted slightly different antinovelty rhetoric. NFIB and
Free Enterprise Fund framed the issue as follows: “Sometimes ‘the
most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the
lack of historical precedent’ for Congress’s action.”256 This formulation
suggests that legislative novelty is evidence of a constitutional defect,
full stop. It omits the Court’s earlier explanation for why legislative
novelty is a sign of a constitutional defect, namely because legislative
novelty suggests that prior Congresses assumed that a statute was
unconstitutional. And it does not include any other explanation for
why legislative novelty might be a sign of a constitutional defect.
But why might legislative novelty be evidence that a statute is
unconstitutional? In the best of circumstances, it could only signal that
prior Congresses’ view was that a statute was unconstitutional. How
could legislative novelty reveal something about a statute’s actual
constitutionality, as opposed to Congress’s views about the statute’s
constitutionality? Part III.A argues that there is nothing in
conventional sources of constitutional law that suggests that legislative

255. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 326 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (joining “the Court’s opinion except for those parts relying on the
legislative history”); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 253 (2010)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (joining the Court’s opinion except for a footnote mentioning “that the
legislative history supports what the statute unambiguously says”); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
594 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The cases improperly rely on legislative
history, broad atextual notions of congressional purpose, and even congressional inaction in order
to preempt state law.”); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“We
are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”).
256. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (quoting Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2009)).
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novelty is, or should be used as, evidence that a statute is
unconstitutional.
Whether legislative novelty itself could make a statute
unconstitutional turns on broader questions about the proper
relationship between the conduct of the branches and actual
constitutionality, specifically when one branch’s actions can make
something true as a constitutional matter. For example, Congress’s
enactment of statutes may make those statutes constitutional if the
existence of similar congressional statutes—or a longstanding pattern
of them—is evidence, or should be used as evidence, of those statutes’
constitutionality. Part III.B explains why, even if such a pattern is the
case for legislative action, it is not the case for legislative novelty—that
is, why Congress’s previous inaction does not make a statute
unconstitutional.
Part III.C then discusses a recent justification that has been
offered for why legislative novelty should be used as evidence that a
statute is unconstitutional. Some scholars and judges have argued that
legislative novelty should be used as evidence of unconstitutionality to
limit Congress’s powers, which purportedly extend well beyond the
understandings of those powers as they existed when the Constitution
was ratified. Part III.C rejects the argument that legislative novelty
should be used as a means to limit Congress’s powers.
A. The Constitution on Novelty and Actual Unconstitutionality
Conventional sources of constitutional law do not suggest that
legislative novelty matters, or should matter, when determining
whether a statute is constitutional. Rather, many of the conventional
sources of constitutional law—such as the text, structure, precedent,
and the values that the Constitution serves—suggest that legislative
novelty should not matter when determining a statute’s
constitutionality.
1. Text. There is no antinovelty provision in the constitutional
text.257 There are instead a host of power-granting provisions that are
at odds with a presumption that novel statutes are unconstitutional. In
particular, the Necessary and Proper Clause provides, “The Congress
shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
257. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (“Our constitutional principles
of separated powers are not violated, however, by mere anomaly or innovation.”).
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Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States.”258 Professor John Manning has explained how the clause
delegates to Congress the power to design innovative governmental
structures and regulatory programs: the Necessary and Proper Clause
creates an “open-ended delegation.”259 The clause allows Congress to
pass laws that effectuate powers delegated to any branch of the federal
government, and it, unlike other clauses, specifically “identifies
Congress as the recipient of” its delegation of power.260 A default rule
against novel statutes is therefore “at odds with the constitutional
allocation of implementation authority to Congress.”261
Other provisions are similarly at odds with a default presumption
that novel federal statutes are unconstitutional. The Tenth
Amendment, for example, refers to “powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution” rather than powers that are
enumerated by the Constitution.262 The phrase “not delegated” implies
the existence of some powers not specifically enumerated by the
constitutional text,263 and the Court has implied some congressional
powers that are not specifically enumerated in the constitutional text.264
2. Structure. The Constitution’s structure also undermines the idea
that antinovelty is a constitutional value. The Constitution partially
reflects a design to empower Congress and provide it with authority to
respond to pressing national issues. The Constitution enumerates an
expansive list of powers and contemplates that the federal government
has powers other than those that are specifically enumerated. From
these and other sources, the Court has inferred that the structure of the
Constitution implicitly delegates powers to the federal government
that enable the federal government to serve national ends, such as
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
259. John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 62 (2014).
260. Id. For a discussion of Hamilton’s similar views, see Daniel A. Farber, The Story of
McCulloch: Banking on National Power, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 679, 687–88 (2004).
261. Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE
L.J. 1607, 1639 (2015).
262. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
263. The Tenth Amendment was enacted together with the Ninth Amendment, which refers
to “enumeration” rather than delegation. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
264. See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1135 & n.35 (2001) (listing as examples the power to regulate immigration,
the power over foreign affairs and diplomatic relations, and the power to protect the American
flag as a national symbol, as well as others); Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of
Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1389, 1394–1401 (2010) (listing examples).
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effectively exercising those powers delegated to it, as well as advancing
values of unity, cohesion, and coordination.265 And a universal
skepticism of novel federal statutes would be inconsistent with a
structure that purports to empower the federal legislature to respond
to national problems and promote national values.
Moreover, the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric does not just prevent
Congress and the executive from adapting to changing problems. It
also prevents states from adapting to changing problems, thereby
undermining the values of federalism and state autonomy. The first
case in which the Court floated the importance of legislative novelty
was New York, a case that involved an agreement between the states
and the federal government to address problems with the disposal of
radioactive waste. The states had lobbied for the statute that the New
York Court held to be unconstitutional, so the Court’s opinion, based
upon antinovelty rhetoric, precluded both state and federal
innovation.266
3. Constitutionalism. A universal skepticism of novel statutes
would also be inconsistent with several of the Constitution’s purposes.
One purpose of the Constitution, and an important value it realizes, is
to provide substantial room for democratic decisionmaking.267 Another
purpose is to provide a workable and enduring structure of

265. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 116 (2010) (“A federal constitution ideally gives the
central and state governments the power to do what each does best.”). The Court occasionally
invokes this kind of reasoning. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 142–43 (2010)
(construing federal custodial power based on the assumption that the federal government could
prevent “an interstate epidemic”). Commentators have spelled out some of the ends of
nationalism, such as having a federal government that is capable of effectively exercising those
powers delegated to it, as well as unity, cohesion, and coordination. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1158–63 (1988) (describing nationalist
premises of federal courts doctrines); Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1085, 1085–86 (2014).
266. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
267. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (“[T]he Constitution contemplates
that democracy is the appropriate process for change . . . .”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy
and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1792–93 (2005). Primus has also noted:
Part of the Constitution’s legitimacy derives from its ability to deliver tolerable levels
of substantive justice; part from the fact that citizens identify subjectively with the
system of constitutional government and claim it as their own; part from the fact that
the Constitution leaves a relatively broad field of play for democratic decisionmaking,
albeit subject to certain constraints.
Primus, supra note 113, at 200–01.
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government.268 The Constitution allows Congress to provide, by
legislation, for “exigencies . . . as they occur.”269 The antinovelty
principle fails to appreciably accommodate these purposes because the
principle would hamstring the legislature’s ability to respond to
problems or resolve disagreements that did not materialize early in
U.S. history.
4. Precedent. A universal skepticism of novel statutes is also at
odds with other precedent, especially that which establishes a
presumption of constitutionality for federal statutes.270 “Proper respect
for a co-ordinate branch of the government” requires that courts strike
down an act of Congress only when “the lack of constitutional
authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated.”271
Courts have accordingly afforded a “presumption of constitutionality”
to federal statutes.272 As the D.C. Circuit recognized when it applied
that presumption to the ACA’s minimum-coverage requirement,
courts “are obliged . . . to presume that acts of Congress are
constitutional.”273
5. History. Historical sources do not say much about whether
legislative novelty is evidence of unconstitutionality. The sources
typically used by originalists—the Federalist Papers, Convention
records, and other statements indicative of contemporary public
opinion—are not principally concerned with how to determine
whether federal statutes are unconstitutional, as opposed to what the
Constitution does and does not permit. And Professor H. Jefferson
Powell has argued that legal traditions contemporaneous with the

268. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (describing the Constitution
as a system of government that would “endure for ages to come” and “be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs”).
269. Id.
270. Some justifications for a presumption of constitutionality turn on the assumption that a
statute represents Congress’s belief that the statute is constitutional. These justifications may be
called into question by this Article’s critique of the antinovelty principle, but other justifications
are not.
271. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883); see also Ogdens v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 What.) 213, 270 (1827) (explaining that “respect” for “the wisdom, the integrity; and the
patriotism of the legislative body” compels the Court to “presume in favour of [a law’s] validity,
until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt”).
272. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 135 (2010) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 410); see Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 23, at 2139 (“The principle that the Court must
presume laws constitutional is as old as judicial review.”).
273. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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ratification of the Constitution do not suggest that the Constitution
should be interpreted only in accordance with its original meaning.274
6. Congressional Practice. Another way of thinking about whether
legislative novelty might indicate that a statute is unconstitutional is to
ask what other kinds of federal laws might have been constitutionally
suspect given their novelty. One measure of any constitutional theory
is whether it “achieve[s] descriptive accuracy.”275 On this metric, the
idea that legislative novelty indicates a constitutional infirmity does not
fare well. Everything is new the first time it is enacted, and many
different kinds of laws are not similar to laws that were enacted in the
first several sessions of Congress. Here are some examples of new areas
of regulation:
•

Antidiscrimination.276 The first federal prohibition on private
entities discriminating on the basis of race was the Civil Rights
Act of 1875.277 Today, federal law prohibits private entities from
discriminating on the basis of race, sex, religion, ethnicity, and
national origin, among other traits.278

•

Maternal Health. The 1921 Maternity Act279 was likely the first
federal regulation of maternal health.280 Today, the Maternal and

274. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (arguing that the Framers’ expectation of constitutional interpretation
does not support an interpretive strategy based on the Framers’ intent).
275. Fallon, supra note 97, at 1203; David A. Strauss, What Is Constitutional Theory?, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 581, 582 (1999) (explaining why a constitutional theory “cannot call for a
wholesale departure from existing practices”).
276. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1–17 (2012).
277. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1211 (2014) (describing how the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 treated race discrimination in public accommodations as a violation of civil, rather than
merely social, rights). That legislation was enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments, which the Court invalidated. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883). Civil rights legislation is now enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under the Commerce
Clause. Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
278. Congress has not yet enacted one of the bills that would explicitly prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. See, e.g., Equality Act, H.R. 3185,
114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3185 [https://perma.
cc/LF2Q-6FVJ].
279. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923) (declining to hear a challenge to the
Maternity Act).
280. See Kate E. Ryan, Mandating Coverage for Maternity Length of Stays: Certain Problems
with the Good Idea, 11 J.L. & HEALTH 271, 295 (1996) (identifying the Maternity Act as the first
federal regulation of maternal health). Although Congress had provided cash or pension benefits
to war widows, these measures were not designed to establish or affect standards for maternal
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Child Health division of the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) conducts a variety of programs and initiatives
“to improve maternal and child health.”281
•

Vaccines. It was not until 1813 that Congress established a
National Vaccine Agency, and the agency, at the time, had power
only to make vaccines available postage free.282 It was not until
1944 that Congress established a federal preclearance regime for
vaccination, the first federal regulation of vaccine standards.283
Today, vaccines are regulated by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) as well as other federal agencies, such as
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.284 Federal law
also establishes a remedy for individuals injured by vaccines.285

•

Animal Health. The Animal Welfare Act,286 a federal law “that
regulates the treatment of animals in research, exhibition,
transport, and by dealers,”287 was not enacted until 1966. Today,
the Center for Animal Welfare Section of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture288 and the Animal and Veterinary Section of the
FDA work together toward animal health.289

•

Insurance. Enacted in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act was the
first federal statute that outlawed monopolistic business

health care. Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law
and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1782–1802 (2005) (describing
pension allotments).
281. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Programs &
Initiatives, HRSA MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH, http://mchb.hrsa.gov/programs/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8ALB-M6NZ].
282. Law of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 37 (repealed 1822), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/vaccines/
vac_act_1813.pdf [https://perma.cc/87YZ-659M].
283. Public Health Services Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 702 (1944), http://uscode.
house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=58&page=702 [https://perma.cc/LV6U-RCWZ].
284. Vaccines, VACCINES, BLOOD & BIOLOGICS, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBlood
Vaccines/Vaccines/ [https://perma.cc/GJL9-MG5F].
285. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa1–34 (2012);
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CTR., http://www.nvic.org/
Vaccine-Laws/1986-Vaccine-Injury-Law.aspx [https://perma.cc/5HFF-TE37].
286. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 54 (2013).
287. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Animal Welfare Act, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. NAT’L AGRIC. LIBR.,
https://awic.nal.usda.gov/government-and-professional-resources/federal-laws/animal-welfareact [https://perma.cc/A6DS-DMNZ].
288. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Animal Welfare, ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION
SERV., https://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare [https://perma.cc/P6
TC-SJRJ].
289. About FDA, ABOUT THE CTR. FOR VETERINARY MED., http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/
centersoffices/officeoffoods/cvm/default.htm [https://perma.cc/VYC4-F5BM].
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practices.290 It was not until the 1940s that the Court concluded
that Congress could regulate insurance under that statute.291
Before that, the Court had suggested that insurance was an area
of regulation reserved to the states.292 Today, federal law
regulates many different kinds of insurance—unemployment
insurance, health insurance, crop insurance, and livestock
insurance, among others.293

There are similarly many examples of new forms of regulation that
span myriad areas of regulation:
•

Conditional Spending. When Congress initially started providing
federal money to states, it merely designated that money for use
in particular areas—to support public schools, for example, or to
build roads.294 Not until the late 1800s did Congress start adding
conditions to federal grants that required states to comply with
certain regulatory directives in addition to requiring the states to
use the federal money toward a general project.295 Since then,
Congress has enacted different kinds of conditions. Some
conditions require states to enact laws that conform to certain
regulatory directives.296 Other conditions are more procedural—
they require states to institute a means for preventing fraud with
federal monies297 or require states to create an enforcement
bureau independent from the regulatory arm that implements the
program.298 There is a huge variety among the different
conditions that are imposed on states in programs such as
Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, civil rights
programs under the Individual with Disabilities in Education Act,

290. The Antitrust Laws, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/TC4G-R2T9].
291. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944), superseded by statute
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1970).
292. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 182–83 (1868).
293. E.g., Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994); 26 U.S.C. ch. 23; Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 80 Stat. 829 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
294. Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 847, 871 (1979).
295. Id.
296. See Pasachoff, supra note 198, at 259, 271–73 (noting such conditions). New York
confirmed that conditional spending is a constitutional means of regulating the states. New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
297. See Pasachoff, supra note 198, at 271–73 (discussing conditions on federal grants).
298. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 251–52 (2011) (involving such
a condition).
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Social Security, and environmental programs under the Clean
Water Act and the Clean Air Act (CAA).299
•

Conditional Preemption (and Other Varieties). Conditional
preemption occurs when federal statutes preclude all state laws
in a particular area unless state law conforms to federal directives.
Early preemptive statutes did not conditionally preempt state
laws;300 conditional preemption is routinely described as a
twentieth century innovation.301 Some examples of conditional
preemption include provisions in the Energy Policy Act of
2005,302 the CAA,303 and the ACA.304 Some federal statutes also
“completely” preempt state laws.305 These statutes turn what
would otherwise be state law claims into federal ones.306 The only
statutes that completely preempt state laws, however, are of fairly
recent vintage, including section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (1947),307 the National Bank Act (1863),308 and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (1974).309

•

Delegations to Federal Agencies. The precise historical analogs to
the administrative state are subject to debate. But it is safe to say

299. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1271–83 (2009) (discussing conditions in some of these statutes); Pasachoff, supra note
198, at 267–69 (same).
300. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124; Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109; An Act to
Regulate Collection of Duties and Tonnage of 1799, 1 Stat. 627.
301. See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL
STATUTORY PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY 6–7 (1992), http://www.library.
unt.edu/gpo/acir/reports/policy/a-121.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6G4-QEE2]
302. See R. Seth Davis, Note, Conditional Preemption, Commandeering, and the Values of
Cooperative Federalism: An Analysis of Section 216 of EPACT, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 406
(2008) (referencing the Energy Policy Act as an example of conditional preemption).
303. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 474, 480 (2012) (using the Clean Air Act as an example of conditional
preemption).
304. See Gluck, supra note 197, at 585–86 (“[S]tates are the default and preferred
implementers of the new federal program, but there is a federal ‘fallback’: the federal government
must operate these programs should states prove unable to do so or if they opt out.”).
305. See Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 549–50
(2004) (listing examples).
306. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (2003) (explaining that the question
is “whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive rather than . . . whether
Congress intended that the cause of action be removable”).
307. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 559–60
(1968).
308. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 5.
309. Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 581 U.S. 58, 66 (1987) (holding that Congress intended
ERISA to completely preempt state law in this area).
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that early analogs to the federal bureaucracy did not affirmatively
delegate the kind of far-reaching authority that agencies exercise
today to prescribe binding regulations. The delegation to the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887 is generally seen
as the first delegation of rulemaking authority significant enough
to resemble modern agencies.310 Today, many agencies exercise
broad grants of power: the EPA,311 the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC),312 the DHHS,313 the Department of Labor,314
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),315 among others.
Congress also sometimes provides agencies with new kinds of
powers. For example, it allows agencies to render statutory
provisions without force or legal effect.316
•

Agency Structure. Congress also regulates the structure of newly
created agencies in new ways: it insulates some agency heads
from presidential removal, it establishes a period of tenure for
agency heads, it establishes multiperson bodies to oversee an
agency or area within an agency, and it requires multimember
agency bodies to include equal numbers of Republican and
Democratic members.317 Many different agencies have different
structures, which could not exist before the delegation of
authority to the ICC. Only in the late 1800s did Congress begin
insulating agencies from presidential removal.318 Today, these
agencies include the Federal Communications Commission

310. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 776 (2013); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation
in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1189, 1206 (1986).
311. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (explaining the
delegation of authority to the EPA “to protect the public health” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)
(2012))).
312. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997) (explaining that the
delegation of authority should be used “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012))).
313. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 209–12 (1988) (listing several
delegations of rulemaking authority).
314. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (describing
delegation).
315. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 632 n.1 (1950) (describing
delegation).
316. Deacon, supra note 225, at 1551, 1561–64 (describing this authority and noting the
discussion of historical analogs in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)).
317. Datla & Revesz, supra note 310, at 786–99 (surveying these restrictions).
318. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
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(FCC), the Federal Election Commission, the FTC, the SEC, and
the CFPB.319
•

All Federal Agency Actions. Because federal agencies exercise
powers delegated to them by Congress,320 agencies may exercise
only those powers that Congress has under the Constitution.
Under the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric, any field in which an
agency is regulating and any form that an agency regulation takes
presumably needs to have some historical analog from the first
twenty to fifty years of the United States. Yet agencies today
regulate in many areas and in many forms that did not exist then.
Consider these examples:
o

EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Rule.
To regulate
greenhouse gases, the EPA embarked on “the single
largest expansion in the scope of the [CAA] in its
history,” requiring entities that release more than a
certain amount of greenhouse gasses to obtain a
permit for constructions and modifications, subject
to certain exceptions.321

o

EPA’s Clean Power Plan. The EPA established CO2
emission standards for new, modified, and
reconstructed power plants and requirements for
states to follow in developing plans to limit CO2 from
existing plants.322 The former involved improving
heat rates at coal-fired plants, substituting naturalgas plants for steam plants, and substituting
renewable-energy
generating
capacity
for
generation from fossil-fuel-fired plants.323 The latter
entailed state-specific emission goals tied to both the
mass and rate of emissions.324

319. See id. at 12–18; see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)–(c) (2012) (establishing the position of
Director of the CFPB as removable only for cause).
320. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (centering on a
delegation of authority “to protect the public health” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012))).
321. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436–38 (2014) (describing the history
of this regulation).
322. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23,
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, and 98); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines
for Existing Stationary Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60).
323. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. at
64,666–67.
324. Id. at 64,820.
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o

FCC’s Net Neutrality Rule. The FCC recently
classified the Internet as a telecommunication
service and then prohibited broadband providers
from “blocking ‘lawful content, applications,
services, or non-harmful devices’ or throttling
(degrading or impairing) access to the same”; from
“favor[ing] some traffic over other traffic . . . in
exchange for consideration . . . or to benefit an
affiliated entity”; or from “unreasonably interfering
with or unreasonably disadvantaging” users’ ability
to use broadband Internet access service or content
providers’ ability to make content or items available
to users.325

o

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Credit
Swaps Rule. The 2010 Dodd–Frank Act directed the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
to oversee the United States “swaps” market, which
had previously been largely unregulated.326 The
CFTC then imposed a host of regulations on swap
transactions, including a requirement that they be
performed on certain markets subject to certain
monitoring and requirements of the CFTC.327

The Congresses that enacted these statutes did not operate under
the assumption that they could only enact statutes that were
sufficiently analogous to laws enacted in the first twenty to fifty years
of the United States. Moreover, the fact that the Court’s antinovelty
rhetoric would have called into question many different kinds of
federal laws suggests that an antinovelty principle would fail to reflect
too much of constitutional law to be a viable interpretive theory. At a
minimum, the antinovelty rhetoric’s potentially far-reaching
implications suggest the rhetoric’s application is, at best, selective,
which is another reason to doubt the validity of antinovelty rhetoric as
a canon of constitutional interpretation.328

325. U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
326. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
327. Swap Execution Facilities, 17 C.F.R. § 37 (2016).
328. See supra Part I.B.
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B. Conduct and Actual Constitutionality: Comparing Congressional
Action and Inaction
The idea that the absence of similar federal statutes is evidence
that a statute is unconstitutional is the inverse of an idea associated
with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland—
namely, that the existence of many, similar federal statutes is evidence
that a statute is constitutional.329 Several critiques of the Supreme
Court’s antinovelty rhetoric apply equally to the McCulloch principle:
Congress’s enactment of a statute may not reflect Congress’s
assumption that a statute is constitutional. And although longstanding
statutes may exist, perhaps the facts or our values have changed to a
point where the statute’s historical presence should not matter.
That being said, there are other reasons—besides the idea that
legislative enactments reflect Congress’s view that a statute is
constitutional—why the existence of similar statutes may and should
be used as evidence of a statute’s constitutionality. The McCulloch
principle may illustrate how Congress’s conduct sometimes affects the
“actual constitutionality” of a statute for reasons unrelated to
Congress’s assumptions about a statute’s constitutionality. Though this
Part does not defend the McCulloch principle, it highlights how some
of the potential justifications for it do not apply to the idea that
legislative novelty is evidence that a statute is unconstitutional. The
contrast between the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric and the McCulloch
principle, therefore, illustrates why legislative novelty should not be
used as evidence that a statute is unconstitutional.
1. Congressional Action as a Sign of Congress’s Views. Some
explanations for incorporating congressional practice into
constitutional interpretation maintain that congressional practice

329. For ease of reference, this Part refers to this idea as the “McCulloch principle,” although
it differs slightly from Chief Justice Marshall’s framing. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote:
[A] doubtful question . . . [regarding] the respective powers of those who are equally
the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not put to rest by the practice
of the government . . . . An exposition of the constitution, deliberately established by
legislative acts . . . ought not to be lightly disregarded.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). Judge Kavanaugh’s recent opinion
holding the CFPB’s structure to be unconstitutional explicitly framed the Supreme Court’s
antinovelty rhetoric together with the McCulloch principle because both reflected the same idea
“that history and tradition are important guides.” PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839
F.3d 1, 21–23 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16,
2017).
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embodies Congress’s assumptions about the Constitution. Congress is
“interpreting” or “constructing” the Constitution in the course of
passing statutes, the argument goes, and statutes therefore represent
Congress’s views about the constitutional text.330 Chief Justice Marshall
described “legislative acts” as “exposition[s] of the constitution” in the
course of explaining why constitutional interpretation should consider
congressional practice.331 The idea that Congress, in the course of
enacting statutes, also interprets the Constitution is related to the
concept of liquidation. In the Federalist Papers, Madison observed that
“[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as
more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and
adjudications.”332 Professor Caleb Nelson has suggested that “the
founding generation[] . . . expected subsequent practice to liquidate the
indeterminacy [of the constitutional text] and to produce a fixed
meaning for the future.”333 And Madison and others believed that those
subsequent practices could include congressional statutes, or at least
statutes that were the product of some deliberation.334
But Part II’s critique of the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric casts
doubt on these justifications. Just as in the case of congressional
inaction, where Congress’s conduct (not enacting a kind of statute)
does not reflect Congress’s assumptions about a statute’s
constitutionality (that such statutes are unconstitutional), the same is
true in many cases for congressional action. That is, Congress’s
enactment of a statute may not reflect Congress’s assumption that the
statute is constitutional, at least in the sense that the statute is
constitutional because it is consistent with the constitutional text. It is
330. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004) (advancing this
argument); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)
(same); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity,
and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27 (describing how incorporating
congressional practice into constitutional interpretation is related to the idea that nonjudicial acts
may constitute precedent).
331. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
332. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 1236 (James Madison) (James E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also
Letter from James Madison to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 143, 145 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott ed., 1867) (“It could not
but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and differences of
opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases . . . and that it might require a
regular course of practice to liquidate [and] settle the meaning of some of them.”).
333. Nelson, supra note 233, at 547.
334. Id. at 526–29.
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fairly easy to see why: in the course of enacting a statute, there is no
guarantee that Congress has actually considered the extent of its
constitutional powers or whether a statute is consistent with the
requirements of the constitutional text.335 Many members of Congress
may not be lawyers or well-versed in constitutional law, and quickly
enacted legislation may not be subject to any rigorous constitutional
scrutiny. Congress also has a limited amount of time and resources,
which it might not devote to abstract questions of constitutional law,336
and the myriad reasons why Congress does not enact statutes—
constituent preferences and political expediency, among others—also
explain why Congress enacts statutes that do not embody or reflect any
consideration of whether the statute is constitutional. Congressional
representatives concerned with reelection will focus on their
constituents’ wishes and concerns, which may not include questions of
constitutional power.
2. Congressional Action as Congressional Conduct. Even though
Congress’s enactment of a statute may not reliably signal Congress’s
assumption that the statute is constitutional, there may still be reasons
to treat Congress’s enactment of a statute as evidence of a statute’s
constitutionality. This subsection does not purport to offer a complete
defense of that idea, but it outlines some possible justifications for
treating the enactment of a statute as evidence of the statute’s
constitutionality that are not called into question by the critiques of the
Court’s antinovelty rhetoric. These justifications include acquiescence,
choices to prefer legislative value choices over judicial ones, broader
understandings of constitutional interpretation, and advancement of
other constitutional values, such as providing room for democratic
decisionmaking or promoting the rule of law.
a. Acquiescence.
One reason judges may assume that a
longstanding pattern of congressional statutes is constitutional is
because the political branches have “acquiesced” to the arrangement

335. See Mark Tushnet, Is Congress Capable of Conscientious, Responsible Constitutional
Interpretation? Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 499, 502 (2009) (“When enacting a statute Congress has no obligation to address
constitutional questions directly, and, as noted below, may not even notice the presence of such
questions.”).
336. See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress,
50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1283 (2001) (explaining why Congress may not consider constitutional
questions).
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provided for by those statutes.337 To the extent a law alters the division
of power between Congress and the executive, both entities have
acquiesced, or consented, to that arrangement, and the statute might
be viewed as legitimate for that reason,338 whether or not the branches
are acquiescing to any claim that the statute is consistent with the
constitutional text’s requirements.339 Moreover, even if acquiescence
might suffice as a justification for separation-of-powers questions, it
might not suffice as a justification for federalism questions. Although
a federal law may reflect Congress’s views about the meaning of
constitutional federalism, it may not reflect the states’ views. There are
differing views on the extent to which Congress—in particular the
Senate—represents the states’ views,340 especially in light of the
Seventeenth Amendment, which made Senators directly elected by the
people.341
b. Legislative Value Choices. One might also incorporate
congressional practice into constitutional interpretation to prioritize
Congress’s legislative value choices when the text is ambiguous or
when it permits more than one reasonable interpretation.342 The text
can only say so much, and it often speaks in vague generalities. Bradley
and Morrison, for example, argue that interpreters rely on historical
practice to determine the scope of the President’s powers under Article
II because little constitutional text speaks to those questions.343
Something similar could be said for questions about the proper scope
of Congress’s delegated powers vis-à-vis the states. The enumerated
list of congressional powers contains several ambiguously worded
provisions. The Necessary and Proper Clause, for example, provides
Congress with the power to make “all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,”344 and
the phrase “necessary and proper” is, as John Manning has observed,
337. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 418.
338. Id.
339. There are also both theoretical and practical difficulties with acquiescence. See generally
Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668 (2016) (describing
these difficulties).
340. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 224–25 (2000) (summarizing different positions).
341. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
342. Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority
from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 83 (2003).
343. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 417–18.
344. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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an “open-ended term[].”345 Elsewhere, Article I, Section 8 authorizes
Congress to “provide for . . . the general welfare of the United
States.”346 The phrase “general welfare” does little to resolve questions
like whether Congress may amend the terms on which states receive
federal money347 or whether Congress may condition a state’s receipt
of funds on the state’s acceptance of terms that are unrelated to the
funds’ purpose.348 The Supreme Court has also held that Congress has
some powers because of the Constitution’s structure, rather than
because of any particular grant of express authority.349 If the text
permissibly allows for multiple interpretations or does not reach a
particular issue, decisionmakers might have reasons to select legislative
value choices over judicial ones.
c. Interpretation of Nontextual Sources. Relatedly, it might be the
case
that
congressional
statutes
represent
constitutional
determinations even if Congress never considers whether a statute is
consistent with the constitutional text. James Bradley Thayer’s original
argument for judicial deference maintained that many constitutional
questions involve more than technical legal issues like the precise
meaning of the constitutional text.350 Rather, Thayer argued,
constitutional questions also turn on broader issues of constitutional
policy and politics.351 In this light, Congress’s assessment of how to best
serve the national interest or how to realize particular constitutional
values, such as liberty or equality, is just as much a constitutional
determination as whether the text of the Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to enact a particular law. Congressional statutes, therefore,
may serve epistemic ends in resolving constitutional questions because

345. Manning, supra note 259, at 53.
346. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Those who ratified the Constitution disagreed about whether that
provision permitted Congress to spend only in areas within its other delegated powers. See United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“Since the foundation of the Nation sharp differences of
opinion have persisted as to the true interpretation of the phrase [‘for the general welfare’].”).
347. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–02 (2012).
348. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).
349. See Primus, supra note 183, at 588.
350. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 156 (1893).
351. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 336, at 1279–80; see also Karlan, supra 106, at 67
(“[M]any of the constitutional cases before the Supreme Court are there precisely because they
raise hard questions that cannot be answered simply by bringing technical acumen to bear.”).
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they embody judgments about our political priorities and how they
should be effectuated.352
Another way of getting at the point is to ask whether a statute’s
constitutionality turns only on whether that statute conforms to the
text’s requirements. Many constitutional issues are not resolved this
way.353 Consider, for example, different uses of historical arguments in
constitutional law. Occasionally historical analysis incorporates history
as a way of “teach[ing] lessons.”354 Historical reflection can ground
principles in experience, but the significance of that experience
requires some normative evaluation. For example, Professor Michael
Dorf has argued that one example of how “[h]istory teaches lessons”
in constitutional law is the way in which the Great Depression and the
period leading up to the New Deal factored into the Supreme Court’s
post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases. According to Dorf, these
cases incorporated “laissez-faire’s inability to revive industrial activity
during a depression.”355 This lesson turns on a judgment about the
inadequacy of laissez-faire economics, which entails both a descriptive
assessment of facts as they existed in the world and a normative
evaluation of the perceived adequacy (or inadequacy) of that state of
affairs. And congressional statutes may reflect descriptive and
normative assessments about facts as they exist or have existed in the
world even if they do not reliably reflect interpretations of the
constitutional text, to the extent that interpretations of the text and
assessments about the facts in the world are independent.
Statutes may also embody other kinds of judgments relevant to
constitutional interpretation. For example, some have argued that
public opinion may sometimes properly factor into constitutional
analysis356 and congressional statutes may incorporate some
assessment—or at least an educated guess—about how the public feels
about a statute, including whether it is constitutional in some broad
sense. Sometimes, political and social movements—and their ability to
persuade others of their causes—help to establish certain

352. See Karlan, supra note 106, at 24–25 (urging deference on these grounds).
353. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 238, at 4 (claiming that “constitutional ‘interpretation’
usually has little to do with the words of the text”).
354. Dorf, supra note 241, at 1815.
355. Id.
356. See Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1207, 1209–10 (2010) (“Just as the text of a constitutional clause or the requirements of a
precedential doctrine can guide good-faith constitutional adjudication, so can the fact that public
consensus supports a particular view.”).
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constitutional rules and determine the content or meaning of
previously established ones.357 And statutes, like judicial opinions, may
reflect assessments about political and social movements and their
causes. Congress may also have constitutional doctrine in mind as it
enacts statutes, even if it does not have in mind the constitutional text
or the original meaning of that text.
d. Constitutional Values: Democracy and the Rule of Law.
Another justification for presuming that statutes are constitutional is
that judicial review—at least the act of striking down statutes—is
always inherently antidemocratic.358 Congress is accountable to the
people via elections, and federal judges are not. Although any form of
constitutional democracy will be antidemocratic in some respects,
ensuring a wide space for democratic politics is one important value
served by a constitution.359
Incorporating congressional practice into constitutional
interpretation may also bolster constitutional legitimacy in other ways.
Under the familiar dead-hand critique of constitutionalism, it is a
problem that the people are governed and limited by constitutional
rules which they played no role in adopting.360 Relying on congressional
practice to inform constitutional interpretation minimizes the gap
between the past and the present, and with it, the dead-hand problem.
When congressional practices inform constitutional interpretation,
people in the present can affect the shape of constitutional rules by
having their elected representatives enact statutes. Incorporating

357. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 2038–42.
358. See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1447, 1450 (2010).
359. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV.
535, 549–50 (1999) (endeavoring to “provide a framework within which readers can determine
how various constitutional theories should be assessed”). Democracy and the rule of law are not
the only values that judges should consider and will occasionally conflict with other values. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARV. L. REV. 43, 75–76 (1989). Democracy also does not necessarily mean that courts should
mechanically defer to all decisions made by the elected branches of government. See id. at 76
(proposing that the term “democracy . . . include both substantive constitutional values as well as
the procedural norm of majority rule,” which “accords with the analysis of most political science
theorists”); see also Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a
Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417, 1425–26 (1997)
(noting two conceptions of democracy).
360. See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112
YALE L.J. 1717, 1718 (2003) (citing Thomas Jefferson at the time of the Founding as stating that
“the earth belongs to the living, and not to the dead”).
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congressional practice into constitutional interpretation, however, may
do more than mitigate concerns with constitutional legitimacy. Some
have suggested that the Constitution “owes its status as supreme law to
contemporary practices of acceptance.”361 Under this view, the
Constitution is legitimate because individuals implicitly consent to it.
But people implicitly consent only to existing practices, so the
Constitution, to be legitimate, must closely conform to those
practices.362 Congressional statutes may provide some evidence of the
practices to which the relevant people consent.
There are also rule-of-law reasons to incorporate congressional
practice into constitutional interpretation.363 An interpretive practice
that suddenly invalidates a large number of federal statutes may result
in a sudden change in how the government works, thereby
undermining rule-of-law values of stability and predictability.364 These
rule-of-law justifications do not turn on whether statutes reflect
Congress’s analysis of the text, but instead on the fact that many
statutes exist and cannot suddenly cease to exist without jarring
consequences. Moreover, judicial decisions purport to contain
generally applicable principles and reasons why a statute is
unconstitutional. Therefore, a decision which declares a statute that is
similar to many other statutes to be unconstitutional will likely create
challenges to similar statutes. Those challenges will succeed even if the
Supreme Court does not decide to hear those other cases, because the
lower courts will use the Supreme Court’s exposition of the
Constitution to find those other statutes unconstitutional.
e. Burkean Values. Some have also offered Burkean justifications
for incorporating congressional practice into constitutional
interpretation. Burkean justifications speak to the importance of
longstanding traditions and how such traditions may represent the
collective wisdom of many generations.365 Traditions may speak to the
361. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian
Positive Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1117 (2008).
362. See Primus, supra note 113, at 190.
363. See id. at 173 (“Probably all players in contemporary American constitutional law agree
that . . . the rule of law . . . [is a] constitutional value[].”).
364. See id. at 211–13, 217–21; see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 427 (“[R]eliance
interests . . . can presumably arise as a result of governmental practices as well as judicial
decisions.”). There may be certain kinds of federal laws that, if invalidated, would uniquely
implicate concerns about reliance, settled expectations, and stability.
365. See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, supra note 330, at 11 (outlining Burkean approaches to
constitutional interpretation).
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practicability and durability of constitutional rules,366 and longstanding
congressional statutes may be evidence that such statutes are workable
and durable.
f. Raw Power. In Thomas Hobbes’ words, “Reputation of power,
is Power.”367 If Congress and the executive want to push forward,
judges may be limited in their capacity to stem the tide because of their
limited ability to stop a committed Congress and executive.368 Professor
Lawrence Lessig has explained how, in the context of the Commerce
Clause, the Court was able to enforce limited federal power at a time
when Congress did not attempt to exercise much of it. But that ceased
to be true once Congress had reason to enact multiple laws that
exceeded prior understandings about the scope of Congress’s
commerce power.369 Even rumblings that Congress and the executive
are not inclined to enforce judicial decisions may be cause for
concern,370 given the dangers of a system in which federal judicial
rulings are openly ignored by other branches of government.371
But there are serious realpolitick concerns even if Congress and
the executive do not intend to openly defy judicial rulings. Judges issue
decisions that provide purportedly generally applicable principles that
explain why a case is decided in a particular way. If the reasons a judge
gives for invalidating a particular federal statute apply to many
different federal statutes, a decision invalidating a federal statute could
invalidate all of those similar statutes. And there is no guarantee that
Congress and the executive would replace those statutes if judges
invalidate them. Thus, even the possibility of a lazy, gridlocked, or
overburdened Congress may be reason for judges to be concerned
about invalidating a statute that is similar to many other longstanding
366. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 892 (1996).
367. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 62 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651) (emphasis added).
368. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (James E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (maintaining that the judiciary would be the “least dangerous” and “weakest” of the
branches because it has “no influence over either the sword or the purse”).
369. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
125, 161.
370. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1015–
24 (2009) (identifying “external constraints” on judicial authority, including inefficacy or nullity
of rulings because of resistance by political branches).
371. E.g., id. at 1027 (“Nearly everyone agrees that officials should regard themselves as
normatively bound by judicial determinations in cases to which they are parties, at least outside
the scope of patently ultra vires rulings.”).
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ones. Even a motivated Congress might not be able to replace all of the
statutes that could be invalidated. And even highly motivated judges
cannot enact statutes, pass regulations, or set up a substitute for the
administrative state. Thus, judges’ limited capacity to provide
replacements may be why judges choose not to invalidate a statute that
is similar to many other statutes that function as the backbone of the
government’s day-to-day workings.
g. Objective Versus Subjective Purposes. There may also be
reasons to attribute to Congress the assumption that the statutes it has
enacted are constitutional. Doctrine frequently distinguishes between
objective versus subjective purposes. Whereas subjective purpose
refers to the actual views and motives held by enacting legislators,
objective purpose refers to something else.372 That something else has
been defined in different ways, but it encompasses something like “the
interests, values, objectives, policy, and functions that the law should
realize in a democracy”373 or “the intent that a reasonable person would
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the
corpus juris.”374 Others have equated a law’s objective purpose with its
“expressive character,”375 that is, what a law objectively communicates.
The precise meaning of “objective purpose” matters less than the
concept of objective purpose. Objective purpose recognizes the
possibility that a law may reflect a purpose that is not actually or
subjectively held by the enacting legislature. And one “objective
purpose” of a law might be for Congress to say that the statute is
constitutional. An enacted statute might objectively communicate that
Congress assumes the statute to be constitutional; at least, reasonable
observers might infer as much from Congress’s enactment of a statute.
Therefore, judges may elect to ascribe to Congress the view that an
enacted statute is constitutional even if Congress did not actually hold
that view.
372. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile
it is possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a statute . . . discerning the subjective motivation
of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.”); Mitchell N.
Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO.
L.J. 1, 26–27 (2001) (noting the difference between subjective and objective views).
373. Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 75 (2002).
374. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
79 (2006).
375. Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1,
56–57 (2000).
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3. Congress’s Conduct: Legislative Novelty. As the previous
subsection detailed, there may be reasons why Congress’s conduct—
acting as if statutes are constitutional—actually makes those statutes
constitutional. Even if these reasons do not ultimately justify the
presumption that a pattern of longstanding statutes is more likely to be
constitutional, they certainly do not justify the Court’s antinovelty
rhetoric. That is, they do not justify why Congress’s failure to enact a
statute should make that statute unconstitutional.
For example, treating congressional statutes as evidence of
statutes’ constitutionality furthers rule-of-law values of predictability
and consistency, and respects reliance interests that may build up
around statutes. Enacting a statute begins a federal program with all of
its accompanying administration, including personnel, buildings,
dispensation of government benefits, and adjustments made by other
federal and state agencies. A regulatory web and private parties’
expectations build up around a federal statute that is harder to change
than the kinds of reliance interests or expectations that may build up
around the absence of one.
Even if there are some cases where reliance interests build up
around the absence of a federal statute, it is unclear how often that
might occur and whether doctrine should protect those reliance
interests. Take the cases in which courts have invoked antinovelty
rhetoric—regulated entities probably did not construct their businesses
around whether a regulating agency had one layer or two layers of forcause removal376 or were headed by single- or multimember bodies.377
And the many states that actively lobbied for the federal government
to require state legislatures to enact federal directives did not rely on
the federal government’s inability to do so.378 Moreover, whatever
reliance interests may build up around the absence of a federal statute
may not be reliance interests that the doctrine protects. For example,
states may have set their budgets on an assumption that the federal
government would not require the state legislature to enact certain
laws or require state executives to enforce federal law. But that is not
meaningfully different than if the state had set its budget on an
assumption that state courts would not be required to enforce a new

376. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2009).
377. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated
and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
378. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992) (“The sited state respondents
focus their attention on the process by which the Act was formulated.”).
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federal statute. Yet Congress may constitutionally require state courts
to enforce federal law.379 States may also have set their budgets on an
assumption that the state government would not be subject to a
generally applicable regulatory obligation, such as a minimum-wage
requirement. But Congress may constitutionally impose that obligation
on the states.380 With respect to private entities, a private entity’s desire
or expectation that it would not be subject to future regulation is
typically not sufficient to immunize the entity from future regulation.
Nor do the realpolitick justifications apply in the context of
legislative novelty. Upholding statutes that prior Congresses thought
to be unconstitutional might upset those earlier Congresses, but they
are not around to do anything. Whereas invalidating a statute raises
concerns about upsetting the day-to-day workings of the government,
upholding statutes typically does not.
The democracy-based explanation for why congressional statutes
are treated as evidence of actual constitutionality also does not apply
to the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric. Treating statutes as evidence of
their constitutionality provides more room for democratic
decisionmaking; treating Congress’s failure to enact a statute as
evidence that Congress lacks constitutional power does not. Similarly,
drawing a negative inference about a statute’s constitutionality from
legislative novelty does not minimize the dead-hand problem. If
anything, overruling the statute exacerbates it. Antinovelty rhetoric
increases the extent to which the people are governed and limited by
constitutional rules that they had no role in enacting by fixing
constitutional meaning according to what the first several Congresses
(or whatever set of previous Congresses) did not do.381
The Burkean justification—the idea that longstanding traditions
represent the collective wisdom of many generations and establish the
workability of those traditions—may apply to the Supreme Court’s
antinovelty rhetoric, but it does not justify it. Under the McCulloch
379. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that state courts are required to
entertain FELA claims).
380. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (upholding the
minimum-wage requirement as applied to the states).
381. This fixing, by itself, is not a sufficient reason to reject antinovelty rhetoric. Many forms
of constitutionalism will have some type of dead-hand problem. See Stephen E. Sachs, The
“Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253, 2256 (2014)
(“[A]ny constitution worth its salt may spend a good bit of time in exile.”). But some bases of
constitutional legitimacy are not undermined by the dead-hand problem. See Primus, supra note
113, at 199–202 (explaining that presentist, subjective identification with the preexisting regime
resolves some of the dead-hand problem).
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principle, the relevant tradition is a pattern of congressional statutes.
It is reasonable to think that the congressional representatives who
voted for a statute had some reason to do so and perhaps even that
their vote indicates that they did not assume that the statute was a bad
idea or disastrous. Moreover, if a statute has been around for a long
time, it is possible to assess whether a statute or its analogues have
resulted in a parade of horribles. So judges might be able to infer from
the existence of similar statutes some kind of collective wisdom that is
relevant to constitutional determinations, as well as the workability of
a statute.
That is less true when the relevant tradition is the absence of
similar statutes. There is no clear “collective wisdom” generated by
Congress not enacting a statute: Congress may not have enacted a
statute because it did not think of it. Perhaps it did not enact a statute
because the pertinent facts had not yet existed or because it could not
get the statute through both houses of Congress. At the very least, it is
a stretch to infer from legislative novelty that every, or even many,
representatives thought that a statute was a bad idea or even
unnecessary. Representatives likely had different reasons—if they had
any at all—for not enacting a statute.382 And the absence of a statute
does not mean that it would have been workable or durable.
Moreover, in the case of the McCulloch principle, Burkean
traditions are being used as a shield—Burkeanism insulates a federal
statute from a constitutional challenge. But in the case of legislative
novelty, Burkean traditions are being used as a sword—Burkeanism
drives a constitutional challenge to a federal statute.383 When Burkean
traditions function as a shield, they work together with other
constitutional values, such as providing space for democratic
decisionmaking. But when Burkean traditions function as a sword, they
work against those constitutional values. And whatever the virtues of
Burkeanism, it is not the only constitutional value.
Finally, the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric is more than just
Burkeanism. Burkeanism emphasizes the value of continuity, and
foreclosing change—or attempting to—is different than ensuring
continuity, which would modulate any change that occurs. Congress

382. See Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constituitonalism and the Limits of Reason, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1493–94, 1506–07 (2007) (explaining that the number of individuals in
agreement matters to Burkeanism and that individuals must answer the same question).
383. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 374–76 (2006)
(explaining the difference between sword and shield Burkeanism).
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rarely enacts legislation that upends the status quo entirely. “[I]n a
society in which revolution is not the order of the day, and in which all
legislation occurs against a background of customs and understandings
of the way things are done,” Congress is unlikely to frequently enact
statutes that upend the entire system.384 Legislators use past statutes as
guides. They rely on the accumulation of precedent, and they rely on
whatever wisdom society has accumulated collectively.385 And if
change occurs through any branch of government, the legislature and
executive should be used rather than the courts. Congress has certain
advantages in making changes, such as acquiring the requisite
information.386
C. Second-Best Solution: The Antinovelty Principle as a Limiting
Principle
The Supreme Court has never explained why legislative novelty is
evidence of a constitutional problem aside from its earlier claim that
legislative novelty means that prior Congresses assumed a statute was
unconstitutional. But some scholars and court of appeals judges have
justified the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric as a kind of second-best
solution. Their justification says that it is unrealistic to expect courts to
“undo” all of the existing statutes that are inconsistent with the original
understandings of constitutional federalism or the separation of
powers (at least, under their account of the relevant original
understandings). But a principle that called into question all new
federal statutes could be a means to ensure that Congress does not
continue to transgress constitutional limits on its powers in new ways.
Take the example of PCAOB. For purposes of PCAOB, the baseline
constitutional principle is that the President has control over people
who administer federal law. Congressional practice and doctrine have
departed from this principle, but preventing Congress from enacting
“new” restrictions on presidential control is a way to ensure that
Congress does not stray even further.
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in PCAOB hinted at this justification
for the antinovelty principle. Judge Kavanaugh wrote, “The lack of

384. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
921, 942 (1992).
385. See Vermeule, supra note 382, at 1511–13 (explaining how legislators rely on
accumulated wisdom).
386. See id. at 1508–11 (explaining how the legislature has advantages in acquiring
information).
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precedent for the PCAOB counsels great restraint by the Judiciary
before approving this additional incursion on the President’s Article II
powers.”387 He also reiterated this justification for the Court’s
antinovelty rhetoric in a subsequent decision invalidating the CFPB’s
structure.388 Barnett offered a similar account of why legislative novelty
should matter in a lecture about NFIB. He argued that “all of the
powers that were approved by the New Deal and Warren Courts are
now to be taken as constitutional.”389 And because congressional
power expanded significantly in the mid-20th century, “[g]oing any
higher . . . requires special justification.”390 He concluded: “This
[constitutional] gestalt can be summarized as ‘this far and no further’—
provided ‘no further’ is not taken as an absolute, but merely as
establishing a baseline beyond which serious justification is needed.”391
This account of the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric—the limitingprinciple approach—does not justify a far-reaching antinovelty
principle, only one that would apply when Congress has departed
from—and the Court has allowed Congress to depart from—the
“correct” constitutional principle. This fact makes identifying the
“correct” constitutional baseline important, and it is far from clear that
PCAOB and NFIB were right on this score. It is unclear whether the
Constitution requires any kind of presidential execution of federal
law392 or whether the Constitution forbids a construction of Congress’s
delegated powers that would effectively amount to a police power.393
Even putting that concern aside, legislative novelty should not be used
as a means to limit Congress’s powers by presumptively rendering
unconstitutional all new federal statutes structuring agencies or
presumptively rendering unconstitutional all new federal statutes on
the ground that they likely exceed the scope of Congress’s delegated

387. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Katyal and Schmidt gestured in this direction
as well. Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 23, at 2149 n.193.
388. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated
and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017) (“The question before us is
whether we may extend the Supreme Court’s Humphrey’s Executor precedent to cover this
novel . . . agency structure . . . .”).
389. Barnett, supra note 112, at 1348.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (arguing, on historical grounds, that it does not).
393. See Primus, supra note 183, at 576 (positing that the principle that Congress’s powers
cannot add up to a police power is unsound).
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powers. That approach to legislative novelty is arbitrary and difficult
to administer, and it does not account for canonical precedents.
1. Arbitrary. Judge Kavanaugh and Barnett’s limiting-principle
approach to the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric is arbitrary. Assume the
correct constitutional rule is that executive officers must be removable
by the President. A limiting-principle account acknowledges that the
current structure of government no longer conforms to this principle
and allows Congress to continue to depart from this principle, but only
in ways that it has already done. That results in fairly arbitrary limits
on Congress’s powers that make little sense of the constitutional
principles that are purportedly at stake in these cases. For example, the
D.C. Circuit maintained that the CFPB’s novelty meant that the
CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional because it interfered with the
President’s authority to execute federal law, “even if it does not
occasion any additional diminishment of presidential power beyond
the significant diminishment already caused by” the Supreme Court’s
prior cases.394
Additionally, permitting Congress to depart from the “correct”
constitutional principle implicitly recognizes that other considerations
may, at times, be sufficiently important to outweigh whatever value
there is in holding Congress to the “correct” constitutional rule. But
that may also be the case when Congress enacts a federal statute that
differs from previous statutes. Perhaps a new area of regulation calls
for different treatment, or perhaps there were unintended
consequences or effects from previously existing regulations.
Depending on the circumstances, any of these reasons may be similarly
weighty to the reliance and rule-of-law interests that require federal
judges not to strike down every single federal statute that purportedly
violates the original understandings of constitutional federalism or the
separation of powers.
Moreover, the idea of grandfathering federal statutes without
acknowledging their constitutionality is a little strange. Grandfathering
is not a recognized way of deciding constitutional cases. If challenged,
statutes are either upheld as constitutional, invalidated as
unconstitutional, or remain as is without an assessment of their
constitutionality because of various justiciability doctrines.
Grandfathering in a litany of federal statutes means those statutes
394. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and
reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
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would be upheld against a constitutional challenge, which implicitly
recognizes that those statutes are, in some sense, constitutional. The
reason they are constitutional may be because some constitutional
change has occurred outside of the formal amendment process.395 But
the fact that there has been constitutional change should cause us to
revisit what the relevant constitutional baseline is and potentially
determine new statutes’ constitutionality on that basis (that is, the
currently existing constitutional baseline). The constitutional changes
that occurred are so important and so entrenched that judges cannot
roll them back, and the statutes that reflect those changes are accepted
as part of the constitutional order. Instead of asking how to judicially
enforce federalism given the increasing scope of congressional power,
the question could instead be what the scope of federalism is in light of
our constitutional practices.396 And judged under this conception of
constitutional federalism, a new statute may not seem out of bounds.
2.
Administrability.
Any
antinovelty
rhetoric
raises
administrability concerns because there does not appear to be a way to
coherently define novelty. Using antinovelty rhetoric as a limiting
principle raises additional administrability concerns because it would
be difficult for judges to determine whether a statute is constitutional
once they have determined that the statute is a new kind of statute.
Whether a statute is “novel” turns on whether it is similar to
previous ones. Accordingly, properly identifying the scope of that past
practice is an important part of determining whether the antinovelty
principle even applies, that is, determining whether a statute is new.397
But historical traditions—specifically, whether current statutes are
similar to preexisting ones—can be defined at different levels of
395. Various scholars have explained how constitutional change occurs outside the Article V
amendment process. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 12–13 (2010); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1056–57 (1984); Strauss, supra note
366, at 905–06, 911–16.
396. Some may resist this claim on the ground that the “meaning” of a constitutional norm
can never change. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact
in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (explaining that the original meaning
of the Constitution is fixed in time and carries forward today). Although that may be true of a
provision’s semantic meaning, constitutional norms may be interpreted according to their
contextual meaning, intended meaning, or reasonable meaning, as well as their interpreted
meaning. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 242, at 1252–63.
397. E.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1088 (1990) (“Moreover, historical traditions, like rights
themselves, exist at various levels of generality.”).
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generality. And there does not seem to be a good—or at least
consistent—way to select a level of generality at which to describe the
past practices and a current statute. For example, a significant point of
disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Printz concerned
how to characterize prior practices. The dissent maintained that the
statute impressing state executives into federal service fell within the
historical tradition of Congress pressing state officers into federal
service. The majority, however, defined the relevant historical
tradition more narrowly, such that the statute fell outside of it. It
maintained that Congress only impressed state judges into federal
service. The opinions in NFIB also disagreed about how to characterize
the relevant statute and the ones that came before it. They parted ways
over whether Congress’s regulation of individuals who were not part
of the interstate market for health care fell within the historical
tradition of Congress regulating individuals who were not part of
interstate markets in drugs (as in Gonzales v. Raich398) or wheat (as in
Wickard v. Filburn399). Some of the opinions maintained that the
statute was different because the statute directly compelled individuals
to purchase an unwanted good. The same difficulty arose in Free
Enterprise Fund: Was the relevant tradition “single for-cause removal”
such that a double layer of for-cause removal fell outside of the
tradition, as the majority maintained? Or was the relevant tradition
“insulation” from presidential control such that the statute fell within
the historical tradition, as the dissent maintained?
Under the limiting-principle approach to the Court’s antinovelty
rhetoric, these determinations can change the outcome of a case.
Determining whether a statute is new affects whether a statute is
presumed constitutional. If the statute is “new,” judges would then
determine whether the statute is constitutional based on the
Constitution’s original meaning. If the statute is not new, judges would
determine that existing doctrine already establishes that the statute is
constitutional. The determination about how to characterize the
relevant past practice involves a fair amount of choice. It is unlikely
that any past practice or statute would resemble a new statute at its
most specific level of abstraction; otherwise, that exact same statute
would already exist. Therefore, judges will need to specify a tradition,

398. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
399. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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beyond the one contained in the new statute, that fairly represents the
statutes that have come before it.400
Courts adopting antinovelty rhetoric also must choose the
relevant time period to assess whether a statute is new. The cases differ
about which time period includes potentially relevant congressional
practice. The Court in Printz and Alden claimed that statutes enacted
in the last fifty years “[were] of little relevance . . . . [T]hey [were] of
such recent vintage that they [were] no more probative than the statute
before [them] of a constitutional tradition that lends meaning to the
text.”401 The Court in Noel Canning, by contrast, represented that it has
previously “treated practice as an important interpretive factor even
when the nature or longevity of that practice [was] subject to dispute,
and even when that practice began after the founding era.”402
Moreover, before the Court adopted antinovelty rhetoric, prior
Justices had suggested in INS v. Chadha403 that Congress’s recent
enactment of many, similar statutes made it more likely that those
statutes were unconstitutional: “[O]ur inquiry is sharpened rather than
blunted by the fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing
with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to
executive and independent agencies.”404
Defining novelty is arbitrary in other ways as well. The principle
appears to be concerned with the number of similar federal statutes—
that is, has Congress, in a certain time period, enacted several similar
400. The same difficulty of selecting a level of generality at which to define past practices also
arises in the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence. When adjudicating a case that purportedly
involves a fundamental right, judges must define what fundamental right is at issue before asking
whether that fundamental right is protected by the Constitution, which in turn depends in part on
whether that right has been “traditionally protected by our society.” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion). Two scholars who have defended the Court’s
fundamental rights doctrine against charges of arbitrariness have suggested one way to save the
fundamental rights doctrine is for judges to identify guiding principles and significant lines of
reasoning from prior cases. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 397, at 1103–05. But the limiting-principle
approach disavows as incorrect many—if not most—prior cases that might guide and constrain
judges’ decisions.
401. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997).
402. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014); see also id. at 2564 (“[T]hree
quarters of a century of settled practice is long enough to entitle a practice to great weight in a
proper interpretation of the constitutional provision.”) (citation omitted). Noel Canning also
defined the minimum duration of an intrasession recess under the Recess Appointments Clause
based on practice up until the time the case was decided. See id. at 2657 (“We therefore conclude,
in light of historical practice, that a recess of more than 3 days but less than 10 days is
presumptively too short to fall within the Clause.”).
403. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
404. Id. at 944.
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federal statutes? But why should it not be enough that there is one
longstanding one? For example, Shelby County suggested that the
VRA preclearance regime was novel and extraordinary.405 But by 2013,
a voting preclearance regime had been on the books for over four
decades.406 Finally, who is to say what number of federal statutes might
be relevant? In PHH Corp., the D.C. Circuit had to distinguish three
other independent agencies led by single individuals, as well as the
many executive agencies that are led by single individuals.407
The limiting-principles approach to antinovelty raises additional
administrability concerns because it is not clear how judges would
determine whether a statute is constitutional once they have concluded
that it is novel. Once a judge determines that a statute is not on all fours
with previous ones, the judge is to determine whether the statute is
constitutional by consulting only the original public meaning of the text
without the aid of the last two hundred years of doctrine and practice.
The limiting-principle approach effectively renders a large subset of
the U.S. Reports nonprecedential outside of the case’s specific facts
because those cases are purportedly inconsistent with the
Constitution’s original meaning. Judges, therefore, could not rely on
those cases in the ways that judges ordinarily do, by identifying their
essential facts and reasoning from them. The D.C. Circuit’s treatment
of Humphrey’s Executor in the PHH Corp. decision invalidating the
CFPB’s structure is instructive. The court framed the question as
whether it should “extend the Supreme Court’s Humphrey’s Executor
precedent,”408 a decision the court of appeals implied was inconsistent
with “Article II and the decision in Myers [v. United States].”409 And
instead of identifying and applying the reasons why Congress had the
constitutional authority to structure federal agencies,410 the court
instead dismissively observed that “Humphrey’s Executor does not
mean that anything goes.”411
405. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624–25 (2013).
406. Id. at 2625 (noting that in the fifty years since adopting the preclearance requirement
“things ha[d] changed dramatically”).
407. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 18–21 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated
and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). On February 16, 2017, the D.C.
Circuit vacated its order in PHH Corp. and scheduled the case to be reheard en banc on May 24,
2017.
408. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 7.
409. Id. at 14.
410. Instead, the court focused on characteristics of the FTC that were noted in the opinion
in Humphrey’s Executor. See id. at 14–15.
411. Id. at 33.
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That is a problem if one believes that the system of precedent
under which judges reason from prior cases protects several important
systemic values.412 Walling off existing precedent results in
considerable transition costs, such as the costs associated with
developing entirely new rules. It would also undermine the rule of
law—specifically, the values of uniformity and consistency—for judges
to announce that, going forward, the reasoning in all previous
separation-of-powers and federalism cases do not guide their decisions.
There is much constitutional precedent compared to very little text,
and because that judicial precedent has driven constitutional
decisionmaking for decades, it would be difficult to suddenly change
course.
Adopting this way of deciding cases would also preclude
decisionmakers from relying on modern case law, which is one of the
most easily findable and decipherable sources of constitutional law.
Foreclosing reliance on precedent may be especially problematic for
other constitutional decisionmakers, such as legislative and executive
officials.413 Federal officials, including agency staffers and
congressional staffers, need to have some sense about whether the
statute or regulation they are enacting is constitutional. But in a world
that operates under the limiting-principle approach to legislative
novelty, there will almost always be a risk that a judge will determine
that a statute is new.414 And if a judge determines that the statute or
regulation is new, the judge will assess its constitutionality by
consulting the original meaning of the enacted constitutional text.
Accordingly, to try and ascertain whether a regulation or statute is
constitutional, agency and congressional staffers would have to do the
same. But how are they to do so? Should they conduct an archival
search and immerse themselves in public thinking at the time? Federal
officials are probably not well equipped to perform that inquiry, nor
should they have to be. Yet the limiting-principle approach to
antinovelty would have the entire federal administrative branch and

412. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach,
111 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis protects the principles of
constancy, generality, institutional responsibility, and fidelity).
413. Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459, 1491–92 (2013)
(“Legislative and executive officials . . . necessarily operate against the backdrop of judicial
precedent.”).
414. This risk is in part because operationalizing the principle is difficult, see supra notes 396–
401 and accompanying text, and because most statutes will be new in some sense or there would
be little reason to enact them.
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legislative officials interpreting historical materials not readily
available, or perhaps even understandable, to determine whether a
federal statute or regulation is constitutional.
3. Viability.
The limiting-principle account of antinovelty
represents that many significant constitutional decisions are incorrect
under its preferred approach to constitutional interpretation. It
maintains that so many federal statutes are unconstitutional today that
judges cannot plausibly strike them all down. The limiting-principle
account of antinovelty then urges judges, going forward, to invalidate
any new statute that is inconsistent with the Constitution’s original
meaning, and it would probably include many new statutes, given that
countless existing statutes are purportedly inconsistent with the
Constitution’s original meaning.
It is generally considered a serious mark against a constitutional
theory if it cannot account for decisions that are celebrated as key parts
of our constitutional tradition. Consider these decisions that upheld
“new” statutes:
•

South Carolina v. Katzenbach415 upheld the VRA, the statute that
first put some southern states’ election procedures under federal
supervision.416 In part because of that statute, “the number of
African–Americans who are registered and who turn out to cast
ballots has increased significantly over the last 40 years . . . . The
Act has proved immensely successful at redressing racial
discrimination and integrating the voting process.”417

•

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States418 upheld the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which banned private entities from discriminating on
the basis of race.419

The limiting-principle approach to antinovelty does not require
judges to invalidate these statutes if they were challenged today.420 But
it asks judges to apply an approach to constitutional interpretation that
may have invalidated all of those statutes if it had been used to assess
the constitutionality of those statutes when they were initially

415. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1965).
416. Id. at 337.
417. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625–26 (2013) (citation omitted).
418. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
419. Id. at 261.
420. But the Supreme Court already invalidated the VRA reauthorization. See Shelby
County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
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upheld.421 That is a problem—constitutional theories are judged, in
part, by the results they deliver, and this theory cannot get us to
decisions that, on many accounts, must be justified.422 Moreover, we do
not know what the next Katzenbach, McCulloch, or Heart of Atlanta
will be. There may be another federal civil rights statute, and there may
be another federal statute that addresses a national economic problem.
Whatever those new statutes are, the method of constitutional
interpretation that judges will use seems likely to invalidate them.
IV. RETHINKING NOVELTY
Most of what remains of novelty is the idea that if Congress has
not done something thus far, perhaps it should never be able to do so.
The idea that legislative novelty is evidence of a constitutional problem
accordingly suffers from some version of the is–ought fallacy—the
mere fact that something has not been done thus far does not establish
that it should never be done.423 The Court’s antinovelty rhetoric relies
on a descriptive statement about what Congress has done to yield a
normative conclusion about what Congress should have the authority
to do for all time. To be sure, there are ways of bridging this gap and
explaining why descriptive statements about congressional practice
yield normative answers about the scope of Congress’s constitutional
authority. But the Supreme Court has yet to attempt to bridge this gap
for the antinovelty principle.

421. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 762–63 (1999)
(“Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch was lambasted at the time as a usurpation . . . . [T]he
enumeration of powers has largely been vitiated as a limitation on the scope of the national
government, due in no small measure to the influence of Justice Marshall’s opinion in
McCulloch.”); id. at 751–55 (describing other original meanings of the clause); Randy E. Barnett,
Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 594 (2010) (noting how Heart of Atlanta relied on an even broader
construction than McCulloch). The Voting Rights Act was certainly new, but whether it was
consistent with the Constitution’s “original meaning” is less clear. See generally Michael W.
McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111
HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997) (arguing that Congress has broader enforcement powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments than Supreme Court doctrine recognizes).
422. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 2030. (“More generally, it counts as a serious strike against an
interpretive philosophy that it requires courts to overturn precedents that are not only part of our
national culture but also celebrated as such.”).
423. See generally DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 293–306 (David Fate
Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., 2000) (introducing the is–ought fallacy); Eugene Volokh, The
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1077–82 (2003) (explaining is–ought
as a “heuristic,” though not necessarily a fallacy).
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This Part suggests that there may still be a role for legislative
novelty, but not in determining whether a statute is constitutional.
Once a federal judge has determined that a statute is unconstitutional
without reference to the statute’s novelty, the judge could then
consider the statute’s novelty in deciding whether to actually invalidate
the statute and ultimately hold it unconstitutional.
This approach to legislative novelty may be particularly useful in
areas of underenforced constitutional norms. Professor Larry Sager
initially described underenforced constitutional norms as ideals that
are embodied in the Constitution but that judges, for various reasons,
cannot fashion into judicially enforceable standards.424 One of Sager’s
examples of an underenforced constitutional norm was the Equal
Protection Clause: “Under th[e] federal judicial construct of the equal
protection clause”425 that is the “permissive strand”426 of rational basis
review, “only a small part of the universe of plausible claims of unequal
and unjust treatment by government is seriously considered by the
federal courts; the vast majority of such claims are dismissed out of
hand.”427 When faced with a constitutional claim premised on an
underenforced constitutional norm, judges may encounter a statute
that offends the constitutional norm—say “unequal and unjust
treatment by government”—but that is not identified as such by the
doctrine designed to enforce the norm. In such a case, the court may
seek to draw limited, rule-like lines that identify specific things that
Congress cannot do. Used in this context, the antinovelty principle may
provide some assurances that the judicially crafted rule will not have
disastrous practical consequences.
There are, however, two caveats about how this kind of reliance
on legislative novelty might work. The first is that the statute’s novelty
is not being used to determine whether a statute is unconstitutional.

424. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1212–13 (1978). In Fallon’s terminology, “a gap frequently, often
necessarily, exists between the meaning of constitutional norms and the tests by which those
norms are implemented.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 60 (1997). Another way of thinking about
the relationship between doctrine and the Constitution is the distinction between interpretation
and construction. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 95–96 (2010) (explaining that interpretation refers to the act of discerning
constitutional meaning, whereas construction refers to how that meaning is implemented into
legally enforceable rules).
425. Sager, supra note 424, at 1216.
426. Id. at 1215.
427. Id. at 1216.
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Novelty instead enters into the analysis only once a judge has
determined that a statute violates some constitutional norm based on
other considerations. Those other considerations include: precedent
and the reasons animating the results in prior cases (including modern
cases); congressional practice, meaning whether a new statute is
meaningfully different from other statutes (including recently enacted
ones); constitutional text (including glosses on the text provided by
doctrine and practice); historical materials not limited to particular
periods in time; and considerations of substantive and moral justice.
The second caveat is that whatever rule the court fashions to
explain why the statute is unconstitutional must itself be coherent. The
line between what is prohibited and what is permissible must make
some sense of the relevant constitutional norm—whether it be the
scope of Congress’s delegated powers vis-à-vis the states or the scope
of Congress’s powers vis-à-vis the other branches of the federal
government. Whatever line a court draws must be able to coherently
explain how an unconstitutional statute is meaningfully different from
permissible ones. Used in this way, novelty could conceivably play a
secondary role when judges are attempting to adjudicate vague
constitutional norms. When judges want to identify a statute as
unconstitutional on the basis of an underenforced constitutional norm,
the fact that Congress has never passed a similar statute may provide
some assurances that finding the statute unconstitutional will not result
in many other statutes also being held unconstitutional.
In some ways, this account of legislative novelty is similar to how
the decision in New York was originally premised on legislative
novelty. The New York Court identified government practices that
had, by the time of the decision, become firmly rooted and quite
common, such as conditions attached to states when they received
federal money. But the Court assured that the practice of ordering
state legislatures to enact federal law was not similarly firmly rooted or
common. The rule announced in New York, however, may fail the two
“caveats” to relying on legislative novelty: there are strong arguments
that the text, original meaning, doctrine, and other constitutional
metrics aside from the statute’s novelty did not suggest that the
Constitution forbids Congress from requiring state legislatures to enact
federal directives.428 Strong arguments could also be made to show that,

428. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 168, at 1030–60. Caminker notes, “The text does not,
either explicitly or implicitly, clearly generate the Court’s sharp distinction between judicial and
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with respect to the values federalism purportedly serves, federal
directives are not meaningfully different from conditions attached to
federal funds or conditions attached to preemption schemes, both of
which are constitutionally permissible.429
CONCLUSION
The Court’s antinovelty rhetoric should be abandoned. Congress’s
failure to enact a statute rarely reflects prior Congresses’ assumption
that it lacks the constitutional power to do so. Antinovelty rhetoric,
accordingly, should not serve as a means of incorporating Congress’s
constitutional assumptions into judicial constitutional interpretations.
Legislative novelty is not a sign that a law is actually unconstitutional,
nor should legislative novelty be used as evidence indicating that a
statute is unconstitutional. Nothing in the conventional sources of
constitutional law suggests that a federal statute’s novelty is evidence
that the statute is unconstitutional, and a presumption that novel
federal statutes are unconstitutional would be difficult to
operationalize in a defensible, coherent way. Using legislative novelty
as evidence that a statute is unconstitutional serves little purpose, and
it could prevent ordinary and legitimate congressional innovation.
Constitutional law will always, in some sense, be about change.
“[I]n almost every instance of the exercise of . . . power differences are
asserted from previous exercises of it and made a ground of attack.”430
Although novelty may precipitate constitutional challenges, it should
not be used to resolve them.

nonjudicial commandeering, and other evidence of the Framers’ original intent actually counters”
this distinction. Id. at 1059.
429. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective,
59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1634, 1657 (2006).
430. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913). In a dissenting opinion to NFIB, Justice
Ginsburg cites briefs from the losing side of three landmark cases that expanded federal power,
including the Brief for Petitioner in Perez v. United States (claiming an “unprecedented exercise
of power”), the Supplemental Brief for Appellees in Katzenbach v. McClung (referencing a
“novel assertion of federal power”), and the Brief for Appellee in Wickard v. Filburn (describing
a “complete departure”). Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (first quoting Brief for Petitioner at 5, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146 (1971) (No. 600); then quoting Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 40, Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (No. 543); and then quoting Brief for Appellee at 6, Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (No. 543)).

